THE INFLUENCE OF ISOLRA’! . | 
ON CICERO, DIONYSIUS 
AND ARISTIDES 


By HARRY MORTIMER HUBBELL 


YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 





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THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 
CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 


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THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 
CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 


BY 


HARRY MORTIMER HUBBELL 7 


APL THESIS 


PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF YALE 
UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Doctor OF PHILOSOPHY 





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PREFACE 


In quoting from Aristides the edition of Dindorf, Leipzig, 
1829, has been used; in quoting from other authors, the latest 
edition of the text in the Teubner series. 

The author is deeply grateful to Professor Hendrickson for 
suggesting the investigation of which this thesis is the result, 
and for constant care and criticism at different stages of the 
work. Thanks are also due to Professor Tukey, of William 
Jewell College, who read the thesisin manuscript, and offered 
many helpful suggestions. 


YALE UNIVERSITY, 
November, I913. 






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CONTENTS 


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INTRODUCTION 


In the Sophistry of the fifth century we may discern two 
distinct lines of activity.'. On the one hand was the study of 
rhetoric, the most important contribution of the sophists to 
education. This was undoubtedly the cause of the popularity 
which was so quickly won by the sophists. At the time when 
the energy of Athens was being expended in perfecting artistic 
forms in sculpture and architecture, in drama and history, 
the sophists in accord with the spirit of the age applied artistic 
principles to the production of speeches. But rhetoric had 
its useful as well as its artistic side. Success in litigation came 
more surely to one who could enhance the value of his argu- 
ments by presenting them in a pleasing form, or conceal the 
weakness of his case by cleverly turned phrases or subtleties 
which perverted the truth. In the larger relations of public 
life political power was the reward of the orator who could 
guide and control the deliberations of the public assembly. 

As a second distinguishing characteristic of a sophist we 
find the ideal of an encyclopaedic education as a preparation 
for all forms of human activity. This was the sophists’ 
answer to the demand for a broader education to meet the 
requirements of the growing complexity of life. In presenting 
themselves as teachers of universal knowledge the sophists 
attempted to avoid the narrowness of specialization. The 
sophistical school at its best was not a professional school, 
although the emphasis laid on forensic rhetoric by some of 
the sophists tended to narrow their sphere. But the ideal was 


1 For the topics discussed in this introduction cf. H. von Arnim, Leben 
und Werke des Dio von Prusa, chap. I; H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhe- 
torik; P. Wendland, in Gott. gelehr. Anz., 1913, pp. 53-59; H. Gomperz, 
in Wiener Studien, 27 (1905), pp. 163-207, 28 (1906), pp. 1-42; Nestle, in 
Philologus, 70 (1911), pp. I-51; Brandstaetter, De notionibus σοφιστὴς et 
σοφιστικός, Leipziger Studien, 15 (1894), p. 204. 

ix 


x INTRODUCTION 


preparation for the πολιτικὸς Bios, or the life of a citizen in all 
its phases. 

The combination of instruction in rhetoric with the ideal 
of encyclopaedic education is characteristic of all the sophists, 
but the emphasis was differently placed by different men. 
Protagoras appears as a teacher of practical business and 
politics. ‘‘A pupil of mine,’’ he says in the Protagoras 
(318 E), “learns prudence in affairs both private and public. 
He learns to order his own house, and is best able to act and 
speak in affairs of state.’’ With this broad general training 
he combined a certain amount of instruction in rhetoric, just 
how much it is impossible for us to determine,! but it probably 
did not assume an important part in his system of instruction. 

Gorgias on the other hand was first of all a rhetorician. 
Such philosophical principles as he possessed were of a negative 
rather than a positive character. His study of eristic was 
hardly a serious pursuit; rather a means for maintaining 
paradoxes to amuse his audience. He ridiculed the sophists 
who claimed to teach virtue. To him Persuasion was the end 
of all education, the source of all power. Persuasion enables 
its possessor to control all men, and therefore is the best 
preparation for the πολιτικὸς Bios. With this as his theory 
he concentrated all his energy on the technique of rhetoric 
as the instrument of Persuasion, and particularly on the 
development of the graces of style. By including epideictic 
with forensic oratory as the object of his teaching, and by 
introducing the devices of poetry into prose he prepared the 
way for large changes in the field of rhetoric. But in every- 
thing except form Gorgias was weak. It was the brilliancy 
of his style rather then the content of his speeches which won 
for him the immediate applause of Athens. 

The union of the two forms of education, rhetorical and 

1 Plat. Phaedrus, 267C: ®AI. πΠρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι 
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα; ΣΏ. ᾿ὈΟρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά. Quin- 


tilian (iii, I, 12) mentions communes loci as part of the rhetorical work of 
Protagoras. 


INTRODUCTION xi 


encyclopaedic, was continued in the fourth century by Isoc- 
rates. Asa stylist he was the natural successor of Gorgias. 
So striking were the contributions of Isocrates to the purely 
formal side of writing that criticism has busied itself with 
this, and his success as a perfecter of style has obscured the 
fact that he continued the encyclopaedic education of the 
sophists of the fifth century. For Isocrates considered himself 
more than a common orator or teacher of oratory. He 
regarded himself as a great authority on political questions, 
made so by his possession of the power of rhetoric, the one 
means for the acquisition of political insight and political 
power. The training in rhetoric produces the power to 
deliberate and the ability both to act and to speak (πράττειν 
kal λέγειν). Rhetoric becomes with him as with Gorgias the 
perfect education; but Isocrates differs from Gorgias in 
rejecting the hair-splitting eristic and fruitless displays of 
ingenuity in which Gorgias delighted, and substituting for. 
them discussion of political questions. In so doing he more 
nearly fulfilled the ideal of teaching πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, and the 
content of his teaching was similar to that of Protagoras, 
while at the same time he maintained the emphasis on rhetoric 
as a form of education. It is this insistence on the value of 
general education secured through rhetoric which makes 
Isocrates the successor of the sophists of the fifth century. 

As the opponent of the sophistical ideal we find Socrates 
as presented in Plato, who rejects the sophistical rhetoric and 
makes knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) the end of education,—a knowl- 
edge which must be the foundation of any true rhetoric. 
Isocrates and Plato are in this exact opposites. To Plato a 
political science is possible, and is the necessary antecedent of 
rhetoric; to Isocrates ἐπιστήμη is impossible; rhetoric is both 
an end in itself and a means to the acquisition of an accuracy 
of judgment (δόξα) which is the best guide to all action. The 
two ideals were diametrically opposite, and anything like a 
compromise between them was impossible. There sprang up 


Xil INTRODUCTION 


between philosopher and rhetorician the most intense rivalry 
for the privilege of training the young men. The details of 
the conflict after the time of Isocrates are difficult to follow; 
this much is certain, that the conflict was ended for a time 
by the complete triumph of philosophy. Rhetoric was 
reduced to a study of style and the technique of argumentation. 

But in the first century before our era there was a revolt 
against the narrowing of the province of rhetoric. To the 
reformers rhetoric seemed to have suffered from being deprived 
of the richness of content which it had possessed before the 
rise of the philosophical schools,—on the other hand phi- 
losophy, while absorbing the content of political rhetoric had 
weakened itself by becoming entirely theoretical, and with- 
drawing from active participation in political life. The at- 
tempt was made to restore the vitality of the old sophistical 
ideal and to combine philosophy and rhetoric in such a way 
that philosophy would be the servant of rhetoric. In this 
revival the influence of Isocrates, the most skillful exponent of 
this ideal, naturally played a large part. It is the purpose of 
this dissertation to trace this influence on some representatives 
of the revival of the early conception of rhetorical education. 


THE INFLUENGEOF ISOGRATES: ON CIGERO) 
DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 


fen OX, Oil Seog bd WA DS 


Tuts chapter aims to present Isocrates’ views of the purpose 
of oratory, and the powers of the orator. It will contain 
little that has not already been made part of the common 
store of knowledge in the pages of Blass and Jebb, and in 
several minor treatises.! My excuse for presenting the facts 
anew is twofold: first, my conclusions are based on an inde- 
pendent study of the material, and will, I hope, add some new 
points; secondly, it has seemed necessary in tracing the 
influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and others, to 
begin with a statement of the principles of Isocrates which 
were followed by these writers. My account of Isocrates’ 
theories will be somewhat one-sided, inasmuch as I shall not 
attempt to trace the influence exerted by his theories of 
rhythm, or by his style, but shall deal only with the larger 
aspect of his pedagogical purpose. 

In Ant., 180 ff., Isocrates describes what he calls φιλοσοφία.3 
‘“We have a dual nature, body and mind. The function of 
the mind is to deliberate, both about one’s own affairs and 

1F. g., Ad. Biichle, Die Padagogik des Isocrates, Prog. Baden, 1873; | 
Matthiessen, Einige Andeutungen iiber die Richtung und den Einfluss der | 


Isokrateischen Schule, Prog. Plén, 1865; R. Rauchenstein, Ausgewahlte 
Reden des Isokrates, Pan~ _.cus und Areopagiticus, Dritte Auflage, 1864, 
pp. 5 ff. om 

I regret that I have been unable to obtain several dissertations which 
apparently bear on this subject. 

2 On the meaning of φιλοσοφία and related words see von Arnim, Leben 
und Werke des Dio von Prusa, pp. 62 ff.; Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 34 ff.; 
Thompson on Plato, Phaedrus, 278p; Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, p. 215; 
Radermacher in Rh. Mus., LII (1897), pp. 17 ff. For other names for 
his φιλοσοφία cf. Ant., 50: δύναμις, διατριβή, Ant., 177:. ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη, 
Ep., V, 4: παιδεία ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους. 


2 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


affairs of state; that of the body is to obey the directions of 
the mind. For the development of these two parts of our 
nature our ancestors devised two courses of training,— 
athletics for the body, and ‘ philosophy’ for the mind. The 
teachers of ‘philosophy’ proceed as follows: first they 
teach the ‘ideas,’ which are used in a speech, then they 
drill their pupils in fitting these ‘ideas’ together in a speech. 
This fixes the ‘ideas’ in the mind and enables the student 
to make better estimates of the proper course of action 
(καιρός), under any circumstances.’? The word δόξα he uses 
here because there is no such thing as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of 
the future; the best one can do is to study and infer what is 
going to happen (θεωρεῖν τὸ συμβαῖνον). It is interesting to 
notice how quickly Isocrates shifts from the purely rhetorical 
side of his instruction to the preparation which it gives for 
practical life. In another passage of the Antidosis we have 
the same thought with a slightly different wording: ‘‘Since 
it is not in the power of man to acquire knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) 
which will enable one to know what one should do or say 
(cf. καιρῶν éyyutépw . . . γένωνται, Ant., 184, quoted above) 
I consider those wise who are able to get the best results by 
use of opinion (δόξα), and by ‘philosophers’ I mean those 
who devote themselves to acquiring this practical insight 
(φρόνησις) in the shortest time.’ 

This practical aim of all his teaching is shown indirectly 

ΤΆΠΕ 193. 

2Ant., 184: ἵνα ταῦτα βεβαιότερον κατάσχωσι καὶ τῶν καιρῶν eyyutépw ταῖς 
δόξαις γένωνται. Cf. Ant., 271: σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν 
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας, 
ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα γήγονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν. Cf. also Ep., V, 4; Helen, 5. 

8 Απί., 271: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει Ty τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην 
λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδεῖμεν ὅ τι πρακτέον ἢ λεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς 
μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, 
φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην 
φρόνησιν. Cf. Adv. Soph., 2-8. 

This idea of meeting the καιρός comes out again in the treatise Adv. 


Soph., 16: ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν. . . . (17) ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας 
δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 3 


in the passages in which he condemns other studies. Eristic, 
astronomy and geometry are useful studies, particularly as a 
preparation for ‘philosophy’ but they are despised by 
the average man, because they have no practical value,— 
they have no connection with life! But Isocrates’ school 
provided the best training for life in all its forms, so that his 
students became orators, generals, kings and tyrants,? and 
those who did not enter public service showed their training 
by the virtue and refinement of their private lives. To sum 
up his theory in modern terms, he provided training in oratory, 
statesmanship (including generalship) and ethics, or, stated 
from a different viewpoint, Isocrates unites in himself the three 
persons of orator,’ statesman and philosopher. 

In discussing the different phases of Isocrates’ instruction, 
it is necessary to begin with his teaching of rhetoric. This 
is the one essential subject, and from this all the other results 


1 Ant., 262: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν εἶναι 
χρήσιμον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν ταῖς μνείαις οὐδένα χρόνον ἐμμένειν ταῖς τῶν μαθόντων διὰ 
τὸ μήτε τῷ βίῳ παρακολουθεῖν μήτε ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐπαμύνειν ἀλλ᾽ ἔξω παντάπασιν 
εἶναι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Cf. Panath., 26 ff.; Helen, 4, 5. 

We may compare other passages in which λέγειν is coupled with φρονεῖν 
and related words which express the phase of Isocrates’ teaching which I 
have just mentioned. 

Ant., 308: τοὺς διαφέροντας καὶ προέχοντας ... τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν. 
Paneg., 50: τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν 
τοὺς ἄλλους. Ant., 292: προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων. . . (294) τῷ καὶ 
πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. 
Ant., 266: φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν προσ αγορεύειν τὴν μηδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι 
μήτεπρὸς τὸ λέγειν ENTE TpOs τὸπράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν. Ant., 277: ἅμα τὸ 
λέγειν εὐὗκαὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς 
τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. Ant., 226: ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πλέουσι καὶ χρήματα 
διδόασι καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι νομίζοντες αὐτοί τε βελτίους γενήσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε 
παιδεύοντας πολὺ φρονιμωτέρους εἶναι τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. 

2 Ant., 30; Ep., IV, 2; Ant., 40. 

3 Ep., IV, 2: οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου σώφρονες καὶ χαρίεντες. 

41 use the term “ογαΐογ ᾿᾿ in spite of the fact that Isocrates did not 
deliver any of his works in public. He was deterred by his lack of a good 
voice and self assurance (φωνὴ ἱκανὴ καὶ τόλμα, Panath., 10; Phil., 81; 
Ep., VIII, 7), and devoted his talents to writing. However from Isocrates’ 
point of view writing has the same effect on the author as speaking. 


4 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


of Isocratean teaching come automatically. After stating! 
that the wise (σοφοί) are those whose “ opinion ᾿᾿ (δόξα) is a 
safe guide in directing word and action, he proceeds with a 
feigned diffidence to explain how one may obtain this power.’ 
“There is no art that can implant temperance and justice 
(σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη) in those whose natural endowment 
is defective; but some improvement is possible for every one.”’ 
Ant., 275: ἡγοῦμαι... αὐτούς γ᾽ αὑτῶν βελτίους ἂν γίγνεσθαι 
καὶ πλείονος ἀξίους εἰ πρός τε τὸ λέγειν εὖ φιλοτίμως διατεθεῖεν καὶ 
τοῦ πείθειν δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐρασθεῖεν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῆς 
πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμήσαιεν, μὴ τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνοήτων νομιζομένης ἀλλὰ 
τῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐχούσης. καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς οὕτω πέφυκε 
ταχέως οἶμαι δηλώσειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ λέγειν ἢ γράφειν προαι- 
ρούμενος λόγους ἀξίους ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποιήσεται 
τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀδίκους ἢ μικρὰς ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων, ἀλλὰ 
μεγάλας καὶ καλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων. 
μὴ γὰρ τοιαύτας εὑρίσκων οὐδὲν διαπράξεται τῶν δεόντων. ἔπειτα 
τῶν πράξεων τῶν συντεινουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξεται τὰς 
πρεπωδεστάτας καὶ μάλιστα συμφερούσας: ὁ δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας 
συνεθιζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον 
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξει ταύτην δύναμιν, 
ὥσθ᾽ ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται τοῖς φιλοσόφως 
καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. That is, the course 
in rhetoric is the foundation, and one who has taken it will 
acquire the virtues needed in public and private life. Let us 
therefore consider first the nature of his rhetorical instruction. 

Three things contribute to make a successful orator,—natural 
ability, practice and education. Of these three, natural 
ability is essential, and experience is next in importance; 
education contributes to make the perfect orator, but is not 
absolutely necessary, and is useless without the two others. 
This is set forth in Antidosis, 186-192, particularly in the 
following passages: 


2 Ant.,(271. 
2 Ant., 272: ἃ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχω μὲν 
εἰπεῖν, ὀκνῶ δὲ λέγειν. 


8 Cf. Shorey in T. A. Ρ. Α., 1909, pp. 185 ff. 





CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 5 


(189) εἰ δὲ δή τις. .-. ἔροιτό με, τί τούτων μεγίστην ἔχει 
δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν, ἀποκριναίμην ἄν, ὅτι τὸ τ ἢ ς 
φύσεως ἀνυπέρβλητοόν ἐστι καὶ πολὺ πάντων διαφέρει. 

(191) καὶ μὲν δὴ κἀκείνους ἴσμεν τοὺς καταδεεστέραν μὲν τούτων τὴν 
φύσιν ἔχοντας, ταῖς δ᾽ ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις 
προέχοντας, ὅτι γίγνονται κρείττους οὐ μόνον αὑτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τῶν εὖ μὲν πεφυκότων, λίαν δ᾽ αὑτῶν κατημεληκότων.ἷ 

(192) περὶ δὲ τῆς παιδείας οὐκ ἔχω τοιοῦτον λόγον εἰπεῖν" οὔτε 
γὰρ ὁμοίαν οὔτε παραπλησίαν ἔχει τούτοις τὴν δύναμιν. εἰ γάρ τις 
διακούσειεν ἅπαντα τὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ διακριβωθείη μᾶλλον τῶν 
ἄλλων, λόγων μὲν ποιητὴς τυχὸν ἂν χαριέστερος γένοιτο τῶν πολλῶν, 
εἰς ὄχλον δὲ καταστάς, τούτου μόνον ἀποστερηθεὶς τοῦ τολμᾶν, οὐδ᾽ 
ἂν φθέγξασθαι δυνηθείη.2 

But, though education alone is not as valuable as natural 
ability or experience, the combination of natural ability and 
education produces a wonderful result. 

(190) τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τυχὼν ὁ τοιοῦτος (1. 6., well endowed 
by nature) παιδείας, μὴ τῆς ἀπηκριβωμένης ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπιπολαίου 
καὶ πᾶσι κοινῆς, τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη ῥήτωρ, οἷος οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἴ τις τῶν Ελλήνων 
γέγονεν; 

The task of reconstructing the τέχνη of Isocrates has been 
performed by Sheehan in his dissertation De Fide Artis 
Rhetoricae Isocrati Tributae. It is therefore necessary for 
me merely to emphasize some phases of this subject which 
are needed to explain the broader aspects of Isocrates’ teaching. 
We have seen from the passage quoted above (Ant., 183 f.) 
that he divided his course into two parts: of δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλο- 
σοφίαν ὄντες Tas ἰδέας ἁπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος 
διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. ‘This is the first step. The second 
consists in repeated practice in weaving these together to 
form a speech.? The second part need not detain us, but 
the ἰδέαι need further elucidation. 

1Cf, Ant., 185. 

2 Cf. Adv. Soph., 15. 


* The same division in Adv. Soph., 16-18. 
2 


6 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


The meanings of ἰδέα and its equivalent εἶδος in Isocrates 
have been fully discussed by A. E. Taylor in his article, 
“The Words εἶδος, ἰδέα in Pre-Platonic Literature ’’ (Varia 
Socratica, pp. 178-267).!_ He finds the following meanings. 

1. The way in which a man “ carries himself,’’ Ad Nic., 34. 

2 ΟΙΒΕΕ HATE ees | 

3. ‘Situation,’ ‘state of affairs,’’ Nic., 44. 

4. An αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶδος, a determinate φύσις or 
essence,’ Nic., 30; Hel., 54, 58. 

5. σχῆμα λόγου, 1. e., (α) an artificial construction of words 
(σχῆμα λέξεως), Evag., 9; Hel., 11; Panath., 2; Soph., 16; Ant., 
46, 47; or (b) a rhetorically effective turn given to the thought 
expressed (σχῆμα διανοίας), Ep., VI, 8, or (c) the “style or 
manner’ appropriate to a literary genre as a whole, Ad 
Nic., 48; Paneg.; 7; ῬΠ11., 143° Hel. 15; Busi i337 ΞΟΡΠ 
Ant. Li 7A ios 

The only points at which I would dissent from his inter- 
pretation are Adv. Soph., 16, and Ep., VI, 8. I quote the 
passages in full: 


‘ 


‘ real 


Adv. Soph., 16: φημὶ yap ἔγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ dv τοὺς λόγους 
ἅπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι 
τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν, ἤν τις αὑτὸν παραδῷ μὴ τοῖς ῥᾳδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις 
ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι τι περὶ αὐτῶν: τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγ- 
μάτων ἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι καὶ μῖξαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξαι κατὰ 
τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι 
πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικῖλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως 
καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν, (17) ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ 
ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι, καὶ δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν 
πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἵαν χρή, τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, 
περὶ δὲ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι κτλ. 

Taylor considers that Isocrates here refers to the σχήματα 

1Cf. also Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote, 
pp. 189 ff.; Jebb, Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, II, p. 37, n. 4; 
Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, II?, p. 32, ff., 108 ff., p. 119 and notes; Volk- 


mann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Rémer, p. 533, ἢ. 2; M. Sheehan, 
De Fide Artis Rhetoricae Isocrati Tributae, p. 20. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 7 


of Gorgias, and more generally, to the variety of ‘ styles,” 
“manners “ἢ taught by the rhetoricians. He identifies the 
ἰδέαι with εἴδη τὰ τῶν λόγων in 17. Here I am forced to believe 
that he is mistaken. Isocrates is making two distinct divisions 
of his course of study; first the ἰδέαι, easy to acquire; second 
(beginning with the words τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ) the use of 
these in preparing a speech—a matter requiring much study. 
It is with reference to this end, namely the adaptation of the 
ἰδέαι to the different kinds of speeches, that the words καὶ 
δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν κτλ. (17) apply. 

The ἰδέαι I take to be not only the σχήματα of Gorgias, but 
the thought elements or ideas, as we should call them, which 
the orator has ready as a part of his stock in trade. This 
will appear more fully from the following passage. 

Ep., VI, 8: εἴθισμαι yap λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ THY φιλοσοφίαν 
τὴν ἡμετέραν διατρίβοντας, ὅτι τοῦτο πρῶτον det σκέψασθαι, τί τῷ 
λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσι διαπρακτέον ἐστίν: ἐπειδὰν δὲ τοῦθ᾽ 
εὕρωμεν καὶ διακριβωσώμεθα, ζητητέον εἶναί φημι τὰς ἰδέας, du’ ὧν 
ταῦτ᾽ ἐξεργασθήσεται καὶ λήψεται τέλος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα. 

Here ἰδέαι does not mean the εἴδη λόγων nor even the divisions 
of a speech. It can only mean the σχήματα λέξεως and the 
thought elements or ideas. It is impossible to suppose that 
Isocrates meant to attain the end which the speech was 
designed to reach, simply by a choice of rhetorical figures. 
These may be included under ἰδέαι, but the term also includes 
the stock of commonplace arguments with which the student 
of a rhetorical school was supplied. 

Thus the word ἰδέα has in both passages the meaning of 
elements, whether of thought or rhetorical form, out of which 
a speech is composed. This is only a broadening of Taylor’s 
view, and is in harmony with his conclusions as to the meaning 
of ἰδέαι in science. 

Blass also (Att. Bered., 112, 108 f.) seems to incline to this 
view. ‘‘ Was dieser εἴδη oder ἰδέαι seiner Reden nennt, sind 
die Elemente, aus deren Mischung jede Rede sich bildet, 


8 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


entsprechend den σχήματα in der Gymnastik und von be- 
grenzter wenn auch nicht kleiner Zahl, so dass ein Wissen 
und ein Lehren derselben méglich ist. Man wird dabei bald 
an die 7 εἴδη des Anaximenes erinnert: Lob, Tadel, Anklage, 
Verteidigung u.s.f., bald an die εἴδη und τόποι (oder στοιχεῖα) 
des Aristoteles; denn der Ausdruck εἶδος besagt dem Isokrates 
alles und nichts, und es heisst so die ganze Gattung von 
Reden wie die Species und ferner das Enthymem und die 
Figur, je nach Umstanden.’’! 

The comparison to the use of στοιχεῖον in Aristotle is inter- 
esting because στοιχεῖον is there used with the same double 
meaning which ἰδέα and εἶδος carry in Isocrates. In Rhet., II, 
22, 13 = 1396 ὦ, 21 and 26, I = 14034, 17, it is equivalent 
to τόπος ἐνθυμημάτων. In Rhet., I, 2, 22 = 13584, 35, and 
Rhet., I, 6, I = 1362 a, 20, it means the ideas. The last 
passage I quote in full: ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι 
σκόπος TO συμφέρον, βουλεύονται yap ov περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ 
τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, 
τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ 
συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς. Then follows an analysis of ‘ good.” 
Some such material, though in a vastly more elementary form 
I conceive to have been what Isocrates meant by ἰδέαι in the 
two passages quoted above. It would also include such a 
treatment of government as is given by Aristotle in chapters 
4 and 8 of Book I.? 

How Isocrates presented this part of his teaching we may 
fairly estimate from certain passages. The peculiar character 
of the speech entitled πρὸς Νικοκλέα has been noted by Blass 
(Att. Bered., 112, 274 f.). It is composed of short, discon- 
nected passages, almost in the style of proverbs, quite differ- 


éé 


1Cf. Sheehan, o. c., p. 20: ea didicisse, e quibus orationes conflarentur 
atque in his usurpandis sese exercuisse. 

Also Blass, p. 32, n. 2: (also die ἰδέαι als Elemente der Reden, nicht als 
Arten). 

2 For a similar interpretation cf. Navarre, p. 190: Autre part le mot ne 
peut guére se traduire que par idées, dans le sens que ce mot a pris en 
francais. (Lettre aux fils de Jason (VI), 8.) 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 9 


ent from the smooth and verbose style in which Isocrates 
ordinarily writes. The reason for this is, I think, not far to 
seek. Isocrates has here put together without the usual 
rhetorical embellishment a collection of ἰδέαι on government 
and private morality such as he put before his students. It 
is in fact an outline of some of his lectures on government. 
Similarly in Ant., 117 ff., and Panath., 82 ff., we have the 
ἰδέαι on the qualifications and duties of a general. In Ant., 
217 ff., we have an analysis of the motives for wrong-doing 
which smacks of the lecture room rather than the court room 
(v. Appendix). 


It is noticeable that while Isocrates is continually talking 
about himself and his profession, he says very little that is 
of aid to us in reconstructing his educational system in detail. 
One point he does make plain—that he is unique among 
educators.!. This is partly due to the fact that like all rhe- 
toricians he is superior to the teachers of eristic, astronomy 
and geometry because he is more practical, partly to the fact 
that he is superior to other rhetoricians in his choice of sub- 
jects. He does not waste his time on petty subjects or cases 
in the courts of law, but writes about great national issues 
and topics of large human interest.2, His own speeches 


1 Ant., 148: σὲ... ἀνομοίως ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ τοῖς idwrats 
καὶ τοῖς πολλὰ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπόρως διακειμένοις. 

2 His attempt to obscure the fact that he had been ἃ λογογράφος leads 
him to a violent attack on the λογογράφοι and the rhetoricians who teach 
simply the art of pleading before a jury. 

Panath., 11: ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ πονεῖν καὶ γράφειν, ἃ διανοηθείην, κατέ- 
φυγον, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων 
οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς ληροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ 
πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων. 

Ant., 227: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω τινὲς ἀγνωμόνως ἔχουσιν ὥστ᾽ εἰδότες καὶ τοὺς 
ξένους τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους καὶ τοὺς προεστῶτας τῆς παιδείας. . . τῶν λόγων 
ἐπιθυμοῦντας, οὐ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις συμβολαίοις λεγομένων οὐδὲ τῶν λυπούντων 
τινὰς ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκιμούντων, ὅμως τολμῶσι βλασφημεῖν 
περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ λέγειν, ὡς ταύτην ποιοῦνται τὴν μελέτην, ἵν᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι παρὰ 
τὸ δίκαιον πλεονεκτῶσιν. 


Cf. also Ant., 2, 38, 40, 42, 260, 276; Panath., 1, 2; Nic., 7. 


Io THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


illustrate his theory, treating the relations between Greece 
and Persia (Panegyricus, Philippus), the relations between 
Greek states (Plataicus, On the Peace, Archidamus), and the 
constitution of Athens (Areopagiticus).! It is this breadth of 
subject matter, this exaltation of the orator above the mere 
pleader in the law court which enables Isocrates to claim for 
the orator the right to speak on all subjects, and to make the 
study of oratory the basis of his course of universal culture. 
With this treatment of the orator’s training, let us turn to 
its effects in practice. 


THE ORATOR AS A STATESMAN AND GENERAL 


‘‘ All the blessings of human society proceed from Persua- 
sion. In other qualities man is inferior to many animals. 
But once the power of persuasion was given to us we ceased 
to live like brutes, and formed a society, founded cities, 
established laws, invented arts—speech has aided man in 
nearly everything that he has devised. It is this which has 
established our laws defining what is just and unjust, honor- 
able and base, without which society would be impossible. 
It is by this that we convict the guilty and praise the good. 
With this we educate the ignorant and test the wise. For 
proper speech is the best evidence of sound practical wisdom. 
With this we debate about doubtful subjects, and investi- 
gate the unknown. “ For in taking counsel we use the same 
arguments that we use in persuading an audience, and we 
apply the name ῥητορικοί to those able to make a public 
address, εὔβουλοι to those able to debate with themselves 

1Jn addition his didactic speeches deal with political questions. Ad 
Nic., 2: ἡγησάμην δ᾽ ἂν γενέσθαι ταύτην καλλίστην δωρεὰν καὶ χρησιμωτάτην 
καὶ μάλιστα πρέπουσαν ἐμοί τε δοῦναι καὶ σοὶ λαβεῖν, εἰ δυνηθείην ὁρίσαι, ποίων 
ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀρεγόμενος καὶ τίνων [ἔργων] ἀπεχόμενος ἄριστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν 
καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικοίης. 

Ibid., 6: καθ᾽ ὅλων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ὧν χρὴ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ περὶ ἃ 
δεῖ διατρίβειν, ἔγὼ πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. 

Ibid., 9: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον, τί τῶν βασιλευόντων ἔργον ἐστίν. 

Ibid., 16: ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES If 


about what is expedient. \ In short, all men of great executive 
ability have had oratorical ability as part of their equipment, 
λόγος has been their guide in thought and action, and the men 
of the highest intelligence have made the greatest use of it.’’! 

In this way Isocrates connects oratorical ability with 
statesmanship. His theory he supports by examples from 
Athenian history. Clisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles and 
Pericles are cited with the words: εὑρήσετε yap, ἢν ἐξετάζητε 
τούτων ἕκαστον, οὐ τοὺς συκοφαντικῶς βεβιωκότας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμελῶς 
οὐδὲ τοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁμοίους ὄντας ταῦτα διαπεπραγμένους, ἀλλὰ 
τοὺς διαφέροντας καὶ προέχοντας μὴ μόνον ταῖς εὐγενείαις καὶ ταῖς 
δόξαις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τούτους ἁπάντων τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους γεγενημένους.2 

In another portion of the Antidosis he enumerates Solon, 
Clisthenes, Themistocles and Pericles, and dwells at greater 
length on their oratory: 

εὑρήσετε Kal τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πολιτευομένων Kal τῶν vEewoTi: 
τετελευτηκότων. τοὺς πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν λόγων 
ποιουμένους βελτίστους ὄντας τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παριόντων, ἔτι 
δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ῥήτορας καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν 
λαβόντας πλείστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους τῇ πόλει γεγενημένους. 

τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν τηλικαῦτα διαπραξαμένων οὐδεὶς NOYwV 
ἠμέλησεν, ἀλλὰ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων προσέσχον αὐτοῖς τὸν 
νοῦν, ὥστε Σόλων μὲν τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφιστῶν ἐκλήθη καὶ ταύτην ἔσχε 
τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν νῦν ἀτιμαζομένην." 

So far we have considered the fitness of the orator for 
leadership in civil life. But Isocrates claims also that the 
best generals are orators. This, too, is illustrated by the 
practice of the Athenians in previous generations. 


1 Nic., 5-9, repeated verbatim in Ant., 253-257. Cf. Paneg., 47-50. 

2 Ant., 306-308. 

?Ant., 231. Notice especially in addition to the passage quoted 
above the following phrases: Κλεισθένης. . . λόγῳ πείσας. (232) Θεμιστο- 
κλῆς. . . ὃ τίς ἂν olds τ’ ἐγένετο πεῖσαι μὴ πολὺ τῷ λόγῳ διενεγκών; (233) 
Περικλῆς καὶ δημαγωγὸς ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος (234). 

4Ant., 225. Cf. 313: Σόλωνα μὲν γάρ, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα 
τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην (σοφιστήν), προστάτην ἠξίωσαν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι. 


τῶ THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιοῦντο καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἡροῦντο, 
νομίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεῦσαι δυνάμενον, 
τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἄριστ᾽ ἂν συμβουλεύσασθαι καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν γενόμενον, 
ἡμεῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτων ποιοῦμεν.ἷ 

We find the application of this theory in the narrative of 
the campaigns of Timotheus, and the reasons given for his 
success.” He succeeded, says Isocrates, while other generals 
failed, because of his better equipment. The ordinary 
Athenian generals were chosen because they possessed fine 
physique, or had seen long service as mercenaries.’ Timotheus 
was physically inferior and had no experience as a soldier, but 
he had a wide knowledge of international relations. Relying 
on men whose experience lay wholly in war for the details of 
the campaign, he was able to devote his attention to the larger 
aspects of the war.5 He knew what a true general must 
know: with whom to fight, and with whom to conclude an 
alliance; how to collect an army adapted to the war at hand, 
organize it and use it advantageously;? how to bear the 
hardships of army life and how to relieve them;® how to con- 
ciliate neutrals as well as conquer his enemies;? how to show 
mercy to the vanquished;’ finally he was able to put an end 


1De Pace., 54. Cf. Panath., 143. 

2 Ant., IOI-139. 

$Ant., 116: ὑμεῖς yap χειροτονεῖτε στρατηγοὺς τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους Tots 
σώμασι καὶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασι γεγενημένους. 

4Ant., 115: Τιμόθεος δ᾽ οὔτε τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ἔχων ἐρρωμένην οὔτ᾽ ἐν 
τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανωμένοις κατατετριμμένος ἀλλὰ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτευόμενος 

. « (116) περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ συμμαχικῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας 

τῆς τούτων οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑμῖν γνώμην εἶχεν. 

δ Ant., 116: ὁ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοιούτοις λοχαγοῖς ἐχρῆτο καὶ ταξιάρχοις, αὐτὸς δὲ 
περὶ ταῦτα δεινὸς ἦν, περὶ ἅπερ χρὴ φρόνιμον εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἀγαθόν. 

6 Ant., 117: πρὸς τίνας πολεμητέον καὶ τίνας συμμάχους ποιητέον. 

7Ant., 119: δεύτερον . .. στρατόπεδον συναγαγεῖν ἁρμόττον τῷ πολέμῳ 
τῷ παρόντι καὶ τοῦτο συντάξαι καὶ χρήσασθαι συμφερόντως. 

8 Ant., 120: ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις ἀπορίας ἐνεγκεῖν στρατοπέδου καὶ πενίας, 
καὶ πάλιν εὐπορίας εὑρεῖν. 

9 Ant., 122: τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τοὺς τῆς πόλεως πολεμίους κατεστρέφετο, τῳ δ᾽ 
ἤθει τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων προσήγετο. 

10 Ant., 125: τὰς δοριαλώτους τῶν πόλεων οὕτω πράως διῴκει καὶ νομίμως, ὡς 
οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τὰς συμμαχίδας. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 13 


to the reign of terror which had disgraced the period of 
Athenian supremacy.! 

Such were the virtues of Timotheus, whom we may call 
Isocrates’ ideal general. They are the virtues of the Iso- 
cratean orator-statesman, the man who can write or speak 
περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων,2 
and can ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου. 
Isocrates put his theory into practice and gave advice on mili- 
tary questions in the epistle to Timotheus (VII) and in the 
Philippus (87, 105), and accompanied Timotheus on many 


of his expeditions.’ 


THE ORATOR AS A PHILOSOPHER 


One division of philosophy has been treated under the 
heading “‘ The Orator as a Statesman.’’ We saw (p. 9) 
that Isocrates wrote not only treatises on actual political 
conditions, such as the Panegyricus, Philippus, Plataicus, On 
the Peace, Archidamus, but also treatises on politics in the 
abstract,—the Nicocles. Thus he occupies two positions: 
he is a practical statesman, and a political philosopher. But 
his teaching goes still deeper. He is not able to make all his 
pupils great orators and statesmen; nature has denied them 
the necessary endowment; all however gain moral power and 
charm of manner.® 


1 Ant., 127: ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου στρατηγίας οὐδεὶς ἂν οὔτ᾽ ἀναστάσεις εὕροι yeye- 
νημένας οὔτε πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς οὔτε σφαγὰς καὶ φυγάς... ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως al 
τοιαῦται συμφοραὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐλώφησαν, ὥστε μόνος ὧν ἡμεῖς μνη- 
| μονεύομεν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Ἑλλησι παρέσχεν. 

2 Panath., II. 

§ Ant., 271. 

4 Plut. Vit., 837C: σὺν w (Timotheus) καὶ πολλὰς πόλεις ἐπῆλθε συντιθεὶς 
τὰς πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου πεμπομένας ἐπιστολάς. 

5 Ep., IV, 2: ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν συγγεγενημένων ἀνδρῶν καὶ 
δόξας ἐνίων μεγάλας ἐχόντων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οἱ μέν τινες περὶ αὐτὸν 
τὸν λόγον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ διανοηθῆναι καὶ πρᾶξαι δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν 
τοῦ βίου σώφρονες καὶ χαρίεντες πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας χρήσεις καὶ διαγωγὰς 
ἀφυεῖς παντάπασιν. 


I4 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


We may distinguish an indirect and a direct source of this 
moral improvement. Indirectly, as the training in speaking 
promoted knowledge of statesmanship, so it makes the speaker 
virtuous. 

Ant., 278: καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁ πείθειν βουλόμενος duednoe THs ἀρετῆς, 
ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μάλιστα προσέξει τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως δόξαν ὡς ἐπιεικεστάτην 
λήψεται παρὰ τοῖς συμπολιτευομένοις. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε καὶ τοὺς 
λόγους ἀληθεστέρους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν εὖ διακειμένων 
λεγομένους ἢ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν διαβεβλημένων, καὶ τὰς πίστεις μεῖζον 
δυναμένας τὰς ἐκ τοῦ βίου γεγενημένας ἢ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πεπο- 
ρισμένας; ὥσθ᾽ ὅσῳ περ ἄν τις ἐρρωμενεστέρως ἐπιθυμῇ 
πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀσκήσει 
καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις εὐδοκι- 
μεῖν.---28ο. τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν εἶναι καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον τὸν λόγον 
πιστότερον ἐποίησεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν 
ἔχοντος ἐντιμοτέρας κατέστησεν, ὑπὲρ οὗ σπουδαστέον ἐστὶ τοῖς εὖ 
φρονοῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. 

Aside from this incentive to right living which every orator 
has, the pupils of Isocrates received from him direct moral 
teaching. We have seen (p. 11) that the instruction in ἰδέαι 
included an analysis of motives such as is given in Antidosis, 
217. But it is as a preacher of virtue rather than a teacher 
that Isocrates finds his true sphere of influence. Not only, 
he says, is there an utter lack of evidence that he corrupts the 
young men who attend his school,! but he encourages them 
to be virtuous,? and does this better than those who make a 
pretense of turning men to lives of virtue. He lays particular 
emphasis on the moral value of his speeches.* 

1 Ant., 30, 60, 86, 92, IOI, 175, 197, 198, 215, 240, 241. 

2 Virtue is not teachable, Adv. Soph., 21. 

3 Ant., 84: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσ- 
ποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι φανεῖμεν ὄντες. 
οἱ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν 
ἀγνοουμένην, ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἀντιλεγομένην, ἔγὼ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων 
ὁμολογουμένην. 


4Ant., 60: ἐνθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ δοκῶ τοῖς λόγοις διαφθείρειν 
τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπειν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνους. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES I5 


Metaphysics with eristic he rejects. This is inevitable for 
one who inclines so decidedly to the practical. The principal 
passage is in the introduction to the Helen. After a state- 
ment of the doctrines of Protagoras, Gorgias, Zeno and 
Melissus he says: (4) ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὕτω φανερῶς ἐκείνων ἔπιδει- 
«ξάντων, ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι, περὶ ὧν ἄν τις πρόθηται, ψευδῆ μηχανήσασθαι 
λόγον, ἔτι περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον διατρίβουσιν’ οὗς ἐχρῆν ἀφεμένους 
ταύτης τῆς τερθρείας, τῆς ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἐξελέγχειν προσποι- 
ouperns, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον ἐξεληλεγμένης, τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις,ἐν αἷς πολιτευό- 
μεθα,, τοὺς συνόντας παιδεύειν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τούτων 
γυμνάζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους, ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησί- 
μων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς 
ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολὺ 
διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν. 

In another passage (Ant., 258-269) he admits that these 
‘studies have some value, and that they are useful as a prepa- 
ration for ‘‘ philosophy ’’; but the student must not allow his 
soul to be starved by such fruitless speculation.! 


67: πάντες of λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν Kal δικαιοσύνην συντείνουσιν. Cf. Ant., 
76-78. 

1 Ant., 268: διατρῖψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβου- 
λεύσαιμ᾽ ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτῶν κατασκε- 
“λετευθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τούτοις, μηδ᾽ ἐξοκείλασαν εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν 
'σοφιστῶν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ 
“τέτταρα κτλ. 


CICERO 


It has frequently been pointed out that Isocrates had a 
strong influence on Cicero. Jebb, a most sympathetic inter- 
preter of Isocrates, has noted the resemblance both in literary 
style and personal character.1 Blass also notices the effect 
of Isocrates’ style on Cicero, and through him on modern 
writers.2, But both have confined their observations to 
Cicero’s imitation of style. It is the object of this chapter 
to show that Cicero derived from Isocrates the idea of the 
function of the orator which he presents in the De Oratore. 

A discussion of the sources of the De Oratore naturally 
begins with a consideration of the letter to Lentulus* in which 
we have the following description (23): scripsi etiam—nam 
ab orationibus diiungo me fere referoque ad mansuetiores 
Musas, quae me nunc maxime, sicut iam a prima adulescentia 
delectarunt—scripsi igitur, Aristotelio more, quem admodum 
quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de oratore, 
quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles; abhorrent enim a 
communibus praeceptis atque omnem antiquorum, et Artsto- 
teliam et Isocrateam, rationem oratoriam complectuntur. 

Here Cicero definitely announces his work, De Oratore, as 
an adaptation of the theories of the two great ancient masters, 


1 Attic Orators, II, 32 f., 69. 

2 Attische Beredsamkeit, 12, 212 f. 

3 Cf. Jebb, II, 68f.: But the best representative of Isocrates in his 
influence on the development of oratory is Cicero. Cicero was intellectu- 
ally stronger than Isocrates.... But as a stylist he is inferior to 
Isocrates. The idea which Cicero got from Isocrates was that of number. 
To this Cicero added special Isocratic graces with more than the richness 
but with less than the elegance of the Greek master. Seldom, perhaps, 
has an unconscious criticism on self told the truth more neatly than does 
the phrase of Cicero when he speaks of having used “all the fragrant 
essences of Isocrates and all the little stores of his disciples." The brilliancy 
of Isocrates had come to Cicero through the school of Rhodes. 

‘Ad Fam., I, 9: quoted in this connection by Piderit in his 6th edition 
of the De Oratore, p. 12, n. 38. 

16 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 17 


Isocrates and Aristotle. I hope to show in the following 
pages that Cicero’s debt to Isocrates is not merely in rhythm 
and style, as has commonly been supposed,! but that his 
whole attitude toward oratory as an art is drawn from Isoc- 
rates.2. Before beginning a discussion of the parallel passages 
in the two authors, it may not be out of place to quote some 
passages in which Cicero expresses his admiration for Isoc- 
rates, and some references to Isocrates’ works which show 
that he drew these ideas immediately from Isocrates, and πος 
from a later treatise on rhetoric. 

First the passages that show his admiration for Isocrates: 

De Orat., II, 3, 10: ille pater eloquentiae—Isocrates. 

De Orat., II, 13, 57: Postea vero ex clarissima quasi rhe- 
toris officina duo praestantes ingenio, Theopompus et 
Ephorus, ab Isocrate magistro impulsi se ad historiam con- 
tulerunt. 

De Orat., II, 22, 94: Ecce tibi est exortus Isocrates, magister 
istorum omnium, cuius 6 ludo tamquam ex equo Troiano meri 
principes exierunt. 

De Orat., III, 9, 36: . . . Isocrates, doctor singularis. .. . 

De Orat., III, 35, 141: Itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere 
Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret, . . . mutavit re- 
pente totam formam prope disciplinae. Cf. Tusc. Disp., I, 4, 7. 

Brutus, 8, 32: . . . Isocrates, cuius domus cunctae Graeciae 
quasi ludus quidam patuit atque officina dicendi; magnus 
orator et perfectus magister, quamquam forensi luce caruit 
intraque parietes aluit eam gloriam, quam nemo meo quidem 
iudicio est postea consecutus. 

Orator, 13, 40: Horum aetati successit Isocrates, qui praeter 
ceteros eiusdem generis laudatur semper a nobis. 

Orator, 13, 42: .. . me autem qui Isocraten non diligunt 
una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur. 


1Cf. Ammon in B. ph. W., 1909, 1396. 
2 It is quite probable that the more specific formulation of parts may be 
adapted or derived from later Greek rhetoricians. 


18 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


I shall next give the passages in which Cicero quotes from 
Isocrates, mentioning Isocrates by name and giving the title 
of the work quoted: 

Orator, 11, 37: Sed quoniam plura sunt orationum genera 
eaque diversa neque in unam formam cadunt omnia, laudati- 
onum [scriptionum et historiarum] et talium suasionum, 
qualem Isocrates fecit Panegyricum, . . . reliquarumque 
rerum formam, quae absunt a forensi contentione ... non 
complectar hoc tempore. 

Orator, 12, 38: In Panathenaico autem Isocrates ea se 
studiose consectatum fatetur; non enim ad iudiciorum cer- 
tamen, sed ad voluptatem aurium scripserat. Cf. Isoc. 
Panatiiyi, 2: 

Orator, 52, 176: Quin etiam se ipse tantum quantum 
aetate procedebat—prope enim centum confecit annos— 
relaxarat a nimia necessitate numerorum, quod declarat in eo 
libro quem ad Philippum Macedonem scripsit, cum iam ad- 
modum esset senex; in quo dicit sese minus iam servire numeris 
quam solitus esset. Cf. Isoc. Phil., 27. 

Cato Maj., 5, 13: Isocratis, qui eum librum, qui Panathe- 
naicus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno scripsisse se 
dicit vixitque quinquennium postea. Cf. Isoc. Panath., 3. 

There is a probable reference to Isocrates in Rep., III, 30, 
42: Duas sibi res, quominus in volgus et in foro diceret, 
confidentiam et vocem, defuisse (dixit). Cf. Isoc. Panath., 10; 
Phil., 81. 

These passages, to be sure, may be quotations from later 
authors, but if we consider them together with the passages 
cited above in which Cicero plainly states his admiration for 
Isocrates, we have more than a mere probability that Cicero 
was drawing directly from Isocrates when he wrote the De 
Oratore. I now turn to a detailed examination of this treatise. 

Cicero sets up in the De Oratore a theory of oratory which 
he contrasts with two opinions commonly held in his day. It 
is not my purpose to discuss in this place the various theories 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 19 


that have been proposed regarding the identity of the schools 
thus attacked, nor even the question whether the De Oratore 
is to be regarded at all as a polemic. Whatever may be the 
truth on this point, it is evident that he is dissatisfied with 
two views; the first, that the orator should be restricted to 
practice in the law courts, and that all the larger questions of 
politics and ethics are material for the philosopher alone;} 
the second, that rhetoric without philosophy is sufficient 
training for a man who is to enter public life.? 

In contrast to these views Cicero proposes the widest 
possible range for the orator’s activity. Illa vis autem 
eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum virtutum officiorum 
omnisque naturae quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae 
vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, eadem 
mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia, quae 
ad quamcumque rem pertineant, ornate copioseque dicat.? 

This was the practice of ancient orators and rhetoricians.‘ 
The activity here referred to falls naturally into two classes. 
Scaevola, summing up Crassus’ argument, says: sed illa duo, 
Crasse, vereor ut tibi possim concedere: unum, quod ab 
oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et saepe conservatas 
esse dixisti, alterum quod remoto foro contione iudiciis senatu 
statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis 
esse perfectum.> To the first Cicero devotes the most atten- 
tion. The orator is to be the leader in the state;® to him falls 
the responsibility and noble privilege of using this, the greatest 
of nature’s gifts, in guiding the thoughts of the senate and the 
passions of the mob.’ 

But it is plain that for the full development of the orator 

ἘΠ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ; ett 40. 

2TII, 24, 93. See passages collected by Schlittenbauer in Fleck. 
Jahrb. Suppl., xxviii (1903), p. 192, n. 3. 

STITT 20; 70: eet Peta 54s), 49,214. 

ΠῚ 120: ΠΟΥ: 


I, 9, 35. 
S111) 17,03 5y Li stiatz2. 


71, 8, 31-34. 


20 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


more is needed than a training in a school of rhetoric. Doc- 
trina recte faciendt cannot be separated from doctrina bene 
dicendi.1 Any such separation as was made by Socrates 
inevitably weakens both the orator and the philosopher.? 
The ordinary orator can outwit a philosopher in a debate on 
the philosopher’s own field, but if any one should combine a 
training in philosophy with rhetorical training, 15 sit verus, 
15 perfectus, 1s δοίη orator. And aside from its utility in 
political life, oratory produces more pleasure than any other 
accomplishment. 

This, in brief, is Cicero’s ideal of an orator. I shall now 
examine the details of his argument and point out the re- 
semblances to Isocrates which it reveals. 

Cicero claims for the orator the ability to speak on every 
subject. This is best set forth in De Oratore, III, 20, 76: 

Illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum 
virtutum officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum, 
quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque 
teneat, eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, 
omnia, quae ad quamcumque rem pertineant, ornate copio- 
seque dicat. 

Cf. also I, 13, 59: . . . oratorem plenum atque perfectum 
esse eum, qui de omnibus rebus possit copiose varieque dicere. 

I, 49, 213: Crassus ... mihi visus est omnem omnium 
rerum atque artium scientiam comprehendere uno oratoris 
officio ac nomine. 

II, 2, 5: . . . bene dicere, quod est scienter et perite et 
ornate dicere non habet definitam aliquam regionem, cuius 
terminis saepta teneatur. Omnia, quaecumque in hominum 
disceptationem cadere possunt, bene sunt ei dicenda qui hoc 
se posse profitetur, aut eloquentiae nomen relinquendum est. 

III, 27, 107: De virtute enim, de officio, de aequo et bono, 

ΠΡ 15,5807 ΙΗ 5,004 ale 

nO Γ ΤΟ 72. 


STII Στ 80. VL 30, Ἴ21, τς 31 125 
ΦΠΠ 5, ΠΗ 1 5.51 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 21 


‘de dignitate utilitate honore ignominia praemio poena simi- 
libusque de rebus in utramque partem dicendi animos et 
vim et artem habere debemus. (108) Sed quoniam de nostra 
possessione depulsi in parvo et eo litigioso praediolo relicti 
sumus et aliorum patroni nostra tenere tuerique non potui- 
mus, ab iis, quod indignissimum est, qui in nostrum patri- 
monium irruperunt, quod opus est nobis mutuemur. 

To attain this result the orator must add to his training in 
rhetoric a wide knowledge, which he can obtain only from the 
philosopher. 

De Orat., I, 5, 17: Est enim et scientia comprendenda 
rerum plurimarum. 

I, 6, 20: Ac mea quidem sententia nemo potuit esse omni 
laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum 
atque artium scientiam consecutus. Et enim ex rerum 
cognitione ecflorescat et redundet oportet oratio; quae nisi 
subest res ab oratore percepta et cognita, inanem quandam 
habet elocutionem et paene puerilem. 

I, 16, 72: . . . sic sentio, neminem esse in oratorum numero 
habendum, qui non sit omnibus 115 artibus, quae sunt libero 
dignae, perpolitus. ... 

II, 1,5: .. . illud autem est huius institutae scriptionis ac 
temporis, neminem eloquentia non modo sine dicendi doctrina 
sed ne sine omni quidem sapientia florere unquam et praestare 
potuisse. 

II, 16, 68: Equidem omnia, quae pertinent ad usum civium, 
morem hominum, quae versantur in consuetudine vitae, in 
ratione rei publicae, in hac societate civili, in sensu hominis 
communi, in natura, in moribus comprehendenda esse oratori 
puto. 

III, 30, 121: Non enim solum acuenda nobis neque procu- 
denda lingua est, sed onerandum complendumque pectus 
maximarum rerum et plurimarum suavitate, copia, varietate. 
Nostrast enim—si modo nos oratores, si in civium discep- 
tationibus, si in periculis, si in deliberationibus publicis 

3 


22 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


adhibendi auctores et principes sumus —, nostrast, inquam, 
omnis ista prudentiae doctrinaeque possessio, in quam homines 
quasi caducam atque vacuam abundantes otio nobis occupatis 
involaverunt atque etiam aut inridentes oratorem, ut ille in 
Gorgia Socrates, cavillantur aut aliquid de oratoris arte 
paucis praecipiunt libellis eosque rhetoricos inscribunt, 
quasi non illa sint propria rhetorum, quae ab eisdem de 
iustitia, de officio, de civitatibus instituendis et regendis, de 
omni vivendi, denique etiam de naturae ratione dicuntur. 

Cf. also Orator, 4, 14-16; 32, 113 — 34, 121. 

We have Cicero’s own statement to prove that this view 
of the universality of the orator’s field was held by Isocrates. 

De Orat., III, 19, 72: Namque, ut ante dixi, veteres illi 
usque ad Socratem omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores 
hominum, quae ad vitam, quae ad virtutem, quae ad rem 
publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi 
ratione iungebant. The veteres alli usque ad Socratem include 
Isocrates as will be seen by comparing III, 16, 59: Sed quod 
erant quidam iique multi, qui aut in re publica propter 
ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique 
sapientiam florerent, ut Themistocles, ut Pericles, ut Thera- 
menes, aut qui minus ipsi in re publica versarentur, sed ut 
huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias 
Thrasymachus Isocrates, inventi sunt qui, cum ipsi doctrina 
et ingeniis abundarent, a re autem civili et a negotiis animi 
quodam iudicio abhorrerent, hanc dicendi exercitationem 
exagitarent atque contemnerent; quorum princeps Socrates 
fuit. 

Isocrates, then, was one of those who combined with 
oratory the study of philosophy, call it doctrina recte faciend1 
(57), or vivendt (57), or faciendi sapientiam (59), or sapienter 
sentiendt . . . scienttiam (60), which was made a separate 
pursuit by Socrates and by all his successors from Plato to 
Carneades, and which Cicero now wishes to restore to its 
former connection with rhetoric. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 23 


Where in the works of Isocrates did Cicero find this doctrine 
expounded? We should not expect to find such emphasis 
laid upon the necessity of knowledge by Isocrates as by 
Cicero. For the two, while defending the same position, 
are defending it against attacks from two entirely different 
enemies. Both hold that philosophy and rhetoric are united 
by nature. But Isocrates is opposing those who reject 
rhetoric altogether and substitute other pursuits, hence he 
emphasizes the value of λέγειν; while Cicero in these passages 
is opposing the rhetores who refused to admit that philosophy 
had any relation to rhetoric, hence he is emphasizing here the 
necessity of a wide knowledge if one would attain success as 
an orator. 

Accordingly we shall find that Isocrates makes two divisions 
of the orator’s training, but does not emphasize the necessity 
of universal knowledge. In a passage in the treatise Kara 
τῶν σοφιστῶν he gives a brief outline of his course. The first 
step is (16) τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἅπαντας καὶ λέγομεν 
καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Then follow the various 
steps of rhetorical training in the narrower sense of the word: 

TO δὲ τούτων ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃς δεῖ προελέσθαι Kal 
μῖξαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξαι κατὰ τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ 
διαμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον 
καταποικῖλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν. (Cf. 
Ant., 183 ff.) 

That Isocrates means by ἰδέαι the knowledge of various 
subjects which an orator should possess, we have shown above 
(p. 6 ff.). This passage forms a close parallel to Cicero, De 
Orat., I, 5, 17f. In the latter passage we have the same 
division that we find in Isocrates,—a few lines devoted to 
scientia, followed by two sections on the rhetorical training 
of the orator. Another point of similarity is the position of 
the passages. Each forms the climax of the introduction to 
the speech in which it stands; each is intended as a complete, 
though succinct, exposition of the training of an orator to 


24 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


which the treatise is devoted. With this in mind we may well 
believe that Cicero had the passage from Isocrates in mind 
when he wrote De Orat., I, 5, 17. 

The objection may be made that while Isocrates considers 
knowledge as necessary for an orator, he nowhere emphasizes 
the necessity for an acquaintance with all the fields of knowl- 
edge as Cicero does. This difference is due to the over- 
emphasis by Cicero, rather than neglect on the part of Isoc- 
rates. For Isocrates, standing at the end of a long line of 
orators who combined practical statesmanship with oratory 
(De Orat., III, 16, 59), and living before the period of separa- 
tion of rhetoric from philosophy, does not feel the same need 
that Cicero feels for laying stress on the multitude of things 
an orator must know. To him it is a matter to be taken for 
granted that the orator must cover a wide field. Accordingly 
we shall find that Isocrates did in practice claim to have the 
scientia rerum plurimarum, although in his theory he does not 
pay so much attention to this point as Cicero does. Thus, 
aside from his forensic speeches, Isocrates frequently treats of 
the principles of statesmanship, as, for example, in the letter 
to Nicocles, 2, 6,9, 16. The body of this letter is devoted to 
political maxims—an example of the ἰδέαι. The treatise 
entitled Nicocles deals with the duties of a citizen. Evagoras, 
41-46, is a statement of Isocrates’ political views under the 
guise of an encomium of Evagoras. In the Panathenaicus, 
108-150, we find a discussion of the value of the different forms 
of government. In addition to these passages we have his 
statement that he taught the management of τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς 
πόλεως (Ant., 285, cf. 99). This can be illustrated by his 
speeches on current political questions: those dealing with 
foreign relations, the Panegyricus, particularly §§ 1-5, 15-20, 
85-90, and the Philippus; those dealing with the relations 
between Greek states, Plataicus, De Pace, Archidamus; and 
the Areopagiticus, relating to political questions of purely 
local interest at Athens. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 25 


Isocrates also treats of the principles of warfare. See the 
recital of the virtues of Timotheus (Ant., 107 ff.), into which 
he has worked such knowledge as he would have imparted to 
a student of oratory. Compare also the modest disclaimer 
in Philippus, 105. 

Isocrates professes to teach also the management of one’s 
private affairs (τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον διοικεῖν Ant., 285; cf. 99) and 
the ethical principles which one must put into practice in 
private life. Under this latter heading we have in Panath., 
30-32, the general statement of the virtues that an educated 
man possesses, and if we accept the work entitled ‘‘ Demont- 
cus ’’ as genuine, we have precepts on the relations to one’s 
friends (Dem., 15, 24-27, 33, 41, 42), relation to parents (14), 
observance of the formalities of religion (13), on demeanor in 
society (15, 41, 42), on the necessity of physical exercise 
(14, 40). In addition to this varied activity, he is, naturally 
enough, a literary critic. (Bus., 1-9; Hel., 1-15.) 

This list will serve to recall the fact that Isocrates did not 
limit himself in the choice of subject matter. In this it 
corresponds exactly to the ideal presented by Cicero. 


Cicero is careful to warn against spending too much time 
on philosophy. The orator must go to the philosopher in 
search of that learning which is by right his own, but of which 
he has been robbed by Socrates and his successors. But he 
need not be terrified by the apparently enormous mass of 
material to be assimilated. For the orator can learn in a 
short time all that is necessary. It is only the professional 
philosopher who spends all his life in philosophy. The 
following passages present this view: 

De Orat., III, 23, 86: Ac, si quaeris, Catule, de doctrina 
ista quid ego sentiam, non tantum ingenioso homini et ei, 
qui forum, qui curiam, qui causas, qui rem publicam spectet, 
opus esse arbitror temporis, quantum sibi ii sumpserunt, 
quos discentes vita defecit. 


26 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


Ibid., III, 23, 87: Ista discuntur facile, si et tantum sumas, 
quantum opus sit, et habeas qui docere fideliter possit et scias 
etiam ipse discere. 

Ibid., III, 23, 88: Ita fit, ut agitatiofne rerum sit infinita, 
cognitio facilis; usus doctrinam confirmet, mediocris opera 
tribuatur, memoria studiumque permaneat. Libet autem 
semper discere. 

Ibid., III, 23, 89: Res quidem se mea sententia sic habet, ut, 
nisi quod quisque cito potuerit, numquam omnino possit 
perdiscere. 

Ibid., III, 31, 123: Quae quoniam iam aliunde non possu- 
mus, sumenda sunt nobis ab iis ipsis, a quibus expilati sumus; 
dummodo illa ad hanc civilem scientiam, quo pertinent et 
quam intuentur, transferamus neque, ut ante dixi, omnem 
teramus in iis discendis rebus aetatem; sed cum fontis videri- 
mus, quos nisi qui celeriter cognorit, numquam cognoscet 
omnino, tum, quotiensquomque opus erit, ex iis tantum, 
quantum res petet, hauriemus. Nam neque tam est acris 
acies in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam 
Misi monstratas possit videre, neque tanta tamen in rebus 
obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo 
aspexerit. | 

Compare also De Orat., II, 27, 120; III, 36, 145. Cicero 
applies his doctrine in explaining the qualifications that an 
orator must possess. (De Orat., I, 5, 17 ff.) As we have 
seen above, he devotes two lines to scientia, and twenty to the 
purely rhetorical side of oratory. 

This view of the ease with which one may acquire the 
necessary training in philosophy is drawn from Isocrates. 
In the speech Kara τῶν σοφιστῶν, 16, we have these words: 
φημὶ yap ἔγὼ τῶν μὲν ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἅπαντας Kal λέγομεν 
καὶ συντίθεμεν, λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν, 
ἤν τις αὑτὸν παραδῷ μὴ τοῖς ῥᾳδίως ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι 
τι περὶ αὐτῶν. Here we have a statement not only of the ease 
of learning, but of the necessity for proper teaching, corre- 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 27 


sponding to Cicero’s si. . . habeas qui docere fideliter possit 
(De Orat., III, 23, 87). The third point in Cicero, st... 
scias ipse discere is given by Isocrates in a passage in the 
Antidosis parallel in general to this passage in the Speech 
Against the Sophists. Ant., 189: τὸν yap ἔχοντα τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν 


εὑρεῖν καὶ μαθεῖν καὶ πονῆσαι Kal μνημονεῦσαι δυναμένην. 


There is a striking passage in Isocrates in which he ascribes 
the rise of civilization to the power of speech and the ability 
to persuade. In Nic., 5 ff. (= Ant., 253 ff.), Isocrates sets 
forth the advantages of oratory: 

τοῖς yap ἄλλοις οἷς ἔχομεν οὐδὲν τῶν ζώων διαφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ 
πολλῶν καὶ τῷ τάχει καὶ τῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδε- 
έστεροι τυγχάνομεν ὄντες. 

This idea is adopted by Cicero in the De Orat., I, 8, 32: 
Hoc enim uno praestamus vel maxime feris, quod colloquimur 
inter nos et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus. Quam 
ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum 
esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent, 
in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat ? 

Nic., 6 (= Ant., 254): ἔγγενομένου δ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους 
καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, περὶ ὧν ἂν βουληθῶμεν, οὐ μόνον τοῦ 
θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες 
πόλεις φκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας 
εὕρομεν, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ Ou ἡμῶν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμῖν 
ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. οὗτος γὰρ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ 
τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἐνομο- 
θέτησεν. ὧν μὴ διαταχθέντων οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾿ ἦμεν οἰκεῖν per’ 
ἀλλήλων. 

Cf. De Orat., I, 8, 33: ut vero iam ad illa summa veniamus, 
quae vis alia potutt aut dispersos homines unum in locum con- 
gregare aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum 
civilemque deducere, aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges wudicia 
aura describere? 

Cf. De Inv., I, 2, 2 f., especially rationem atque orationem (2), 


28 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


and sec. 3: Age vero, urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et 
iustitiam retinere discerent et aliis parere sua voluntate con- 
suescerent ac non modo labores excipiendos communis com- 
modi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent: qui 
tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea, quae ratione invenissent, 
eloquentia persuadere potuissent? 

The union of ratio et oratio (De Inv.) which expresses in 
different words the idea perfect oratoris moderatio et sapientia 
(De Orat., I, 8, 34) corresponds to the union of φρονεῖν καὶ 
λέγειν which is common in Isocrates (Paneg., 50; Ant., 207, 
277, 293, 294, 308) although not mentioned in this passage 
in just this form, but hinted at in τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ 
φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα (Nicocles, 7). 

As bearing on the general question of the influence οἱ Isoc- 
rates on Cicero, it is interesting to note the relative impor- 
tance that these passages bear to the rest of the works in which 
they stand. In Cicero, both in the De Inventione and in the 
De Oratore the passage quoted stands at the beginning of the 
discussion, and in the De Oratore it strikes the keynote of the 
whole treatise; in Isocrates the passage is so definitely a part 
of his system that he repeats it verbatim in the Antidosis, 
§ 253 ff.; and gives us the same thought in different words 
in Paneg., 48 ff.? 

1 There is also a similar ring to the conclusions of the paragraphs in the 
two authors. Isoc. Nicocles, 9: εἰ δὲ def συλλήβδην κτὰ; Cic., De Orat., I, 
8, 34: Ac ne plura, etc. 

2 Cicero sums up the praise of oratory at the beginning of Scaevola’s 
reply (I, 9, 35): unum quod ab oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et 
saepe conservatas esse dixisti, alterum, quod remoto foro contione iudiciis 
senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse 
perfectum. Cf. 32 f. 

The latter point, general perfection in all intercourse and culture, is 
not treated by Isocrates in the passages quoted above, but is given in 
his definition of an educated man, Panath., 26 ff. Here four points are 
mentioned as essential: (1) practical ability, (2) social propriety, (3) self- 
control in the presence of pleasure and disaster, (4) moderation, lack of 


false pride, εὖ φρονεῖν. The second point I give in full as it affords a parallel 
to the passage from Cicero quoted above. Panath., 31: τοὺς πρεπόντως 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 29 


An attempt has been made by Philippson (in Fleck. Jahr- 
biicher, 133 (1886), p. 418) supported by Norden (Fleck. 
Jahrb. Suppl., XIX (1893), p. 427) and Kroll (Rh. Mus., 58 
(1903), p. 518) to assign Posidonius as a source for Cicero’s 
De: Orataulons3)and:30-3 Deiinv:: ΖΉΣΗ Fuse.) sles: 
62 ff.; V, 2, 5 ff. Philippson bases his argument on the resem- 
blance between the passages in Cicero and the opening sec- 
tions (1-6) of Seneca, Ep. 90. Seneca is confessedly following 
Posidonius,! in ascribing the blessings of civilization to phi- 
losophia. And there is a striking resemblance between the 
passage in Seneca and the two passages in the Tusculan Dis- 
putations. It may be quite possible that Cicero in writing 
these words in the Tusculans, had in mind the doctrine of 
Posidonius. But when we come to consider the other passages 
Mont Asicero, ΝΖ. 9) 6 ἔν 1 2. 2. ὉΠ ) Οὐ ὙΠ Soaseres: 
36, we find that eloquentia (De Inv., I, 2, 3) or as it is expressed 
in the De Oratore (I, 8, 34) perfects oratoris moderatio et 
sapientia is given as the civilizing force. In order to account 
for this discrepancy, Philippson resorts to the Stoic principles 
of Posidonius, in accordance with which eloquentia was one 
of the virtues, and the sapiens who possesses one virtue 
possesses them all, and therefore possesses eloquentia. But it 
is improbable that a Stoic laid such emphasis on oratory as 
Cicero does, and in the absence of any mention of it in the 
passage from Seneca we must acknowledge that Philippson’s 
identification of Posidonius as a source for the De Oratore 
and De Inventione is scarcely justified.2 It would be much 
καὶ δικαίως ὁμιλοῦντας τοῖς del πλησιάζουσι, Kal Tas μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας Kal 
βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὡς δύνατον ἐλαφροτάτους 
καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας. 

1Ep., 90, 7: hactenus Posidonio adsentior. 

2 Cf. the disparaging opinion of this kind of oratory in De Orat., I, 18, 
83; II, 38, 159; cf. Brut., 118. De Orat., III, 18, 65, and I, 18, 83, would 
seem to support Philippson’s view. In both these passages Cicero com- 
mends the Stoics for considering eloquence as a virtue, and in I, 18, 83, 


he distinctly says that the Stoics considered eloquentiam ... unam 
quandam esse virtutem et qui unam virtutem haberet, omnis habere easque 


30 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


more natural to attribute those two views of the origin of 
civilization to two different sources. In the Tusculan Dis- 
putations, where Cicero is writing from the point of view of a 
philosopher, he may have followed Posidonius. But the 
source of the corresponding passages in the oratorical works 
must be sought elsewhere. We have such a source in Isoc- 
rates. 

It is interesting to note, however, that in T. D., V, 3, 8, it 
is said that Leon admired the ingenium et eloquentiam of 
Pythagoras. This is the only time that eloquentia is men- 
tioned in this passage. The passage is designed to praise 
philosophy, but Cicero cannot repress his admiration for 
rhetoric. Note also that Pythagoras is accepted by Isocrates 
as one of his ideals (Bus., 28). 


Cicero recurs again and again to his ideal of the union of 


esse inter se aequalis et paris; ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes omnes 
habere atque esse sapientem. But in III, 18, 65, he rejects the Stoic philos- 
ophy as inconsistent with good rhetorical practice; the only good he can see 
in the Stoics is that, owing to the peculiarities of their system, eloquentia = 
sapientia,—a view which was Cicero’s own. However the resemblance 
between Cicero and the Stoics is merely in words. If we compare Cicero’s 
other expressions about the Stoic rhetoric we find that in his judgment the 
Stoic formula really meant, ‘‘ Stoic rhetoric’’ (ἡ. e., spinosa quaedam et 
exilis oratio longeque ab nostris sensibus abhorrens, I, 18, 83) = “ Stoic 
philosophy ”’ (a peculiar doctrine at variance with the common sense of 
mankind, III, 18,66). We see, too, from I, 18, 83, that the Stoics rejected a 
definition of an orator which would satisfy Cicero (ipse Mnesarchus, hos, 
quos nos oratores vocaremus, nihil esse dicebat nisi quosdam operarios 
lingua celeri et exercitata) and held that the only true orator was the 
sapiens, 1. 6., a Stoic philosopher. Moreover in I, 11, 46, we find that the 
philosophers, Stoics included, denied the right of the orator to any part of 
the field of philosophy, that is, they opposed one of the main points of 
Cicero’s rhetorical theory. It is clear that we must seek for the sources 
of the De Oratore not among the philosophers but among the rhetoricians. 

1For a similar theory of the origin of society originating with Demo- 
critus and continued by a series of philosophers see Reinhart in Hermes, 
XLVII (1912). Dickerman (De Argumentis quibusdam e structura hom- 
inis et animalium petitis, p. 32) compares Cic. De Orat., I, 8, 32, with 
Isoc. Nic., 5 and Aristot. Pol., 1253a,10 and other places where the in- 
feriority of man to animals is noticed. In none of these passages, however, 
s the parallel to Cicero so close as in Isocrates. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 21 


the orator and the statesman in one person. This is to him 
the natural condition. Thus in the early periods of Greek 
history no one thought of making a division between oratory 
and political philosophy. (De Orat., III, 34, 137 ff.; III, 15, 
57-60.) Socrates (III, 16, 59f.) was the first to separate 
oratory and philosophy, and to devote himself to the latter to 
the exclusion of the former. Since the time of Socrates there 
has been a constant strife between the supporters of rhetoric 
and the supporters of the narrow Socratic view of philosophy, 
with the result that both orator and philosopher have suffered 
from want of that perfect union which should exist between 
them (De Orat., III, 19, 72). Cicero includes Isocrates 
among those who represented his ideal (III, 16, 59). It is 
clear also from the passages quoted above that Isocrates 
advocated exactly the same union of philosopher and states- 
man that Cicero does. The general similarity between the 
principles of the two orators is therefore plain; we may now 
look for passages in Cicero which point to Isocrates as the 
source from which Cicero drew his ideal. 

Isocrates in Ant., 230-236, supports his view that orators 
make the best statesmen by appealing to Athenian history. 
He enumerates Solon, Clisthenes, Themistocles and Pericles, 
men who are acknowledged to have been the greatest bene- 
factors of Athens, and shows that each was a great orator as 
well as a great statesman, and that without the gift of oratory 
they would have been powerless to benefit their country. He 
repeats the thought in Ant., 306-308, this time describing, 
without mentioning names, Clisthenes, Miltiades, Themis- 
tocles and Pericles. (Cf. also 313.) 

It is difficult for Isocrates to find evidence on which to base 
his claim that all these men were orators in the Isocratean 
meaning of the word. About Pericles there is no doubt, and 
Isocrates comes out boldly with δημαγωγὸς ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ 
ἄριστος (234). But in regard to Themistocles he is reduced to 
an argument from probability: . ..6 τίς ἂν οἷός τ᾽ éyévero 


32 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


πεῖσαι μὴ πολὺ τῷ λόγῳ διενεγκὠν (233); Clisthenes is claimed 
as an orator on the strength of the phrase λόγῳ πείσας τοὺς 
᾿Αμφικτύονας (232), which cannot except by the most barefaced 
sophistry be twisted into meaning that he was a professional 
orator after the manner of Isocrates. Solon is claimed by a 
similar play on the word σοφιστής (235; cf. 313). Inthe second 
passage (306-308) the examples are treated collectively in the 
words εὑρήσετε yap, ἢν ἐξετάζητε τούτων ἕκαστον, . . . διαφέροντας 
καὶ προέχοντας . .. τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν (308), where the 
promise εὑρήσετε covers Isocrates’ lack of evidence. 

This line of argument is adopted by Cicero in the De 
Oratore. In a digression (III, 56-61) on the relation of 
rhetoric to philosophy, he twice names Greek statesmen as 
possessing ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendt 
dicendique sapientiam (III, 16,59). The statesmen mentioned 
are Lycurgus, Pittacus, Solon (56), Themistocles, Pericles, 
Theramenes (59), and parallel to these is a list of Romans, 
Coruncanius, Fabricius, Cato, Scipio (56). The list does not 
correspond exactly to Isocrates’ list, nor was it to be expected 
that, quoting from memory, Cicero would take the same ex- 
amples that Isocrates uses. The more essential point of 
similarity is that Cicero adopts from Isocrates the form of the 
argument with all its inconsistencies. He recognizes the 
difficulty which presents itself to anyone who attempts to 
prove that oratory was part of the equipment of the Roman 
heroes,! but contents himself with a reaffirmation of his belief 
that they were orators (I, 13, 58). 

Thus we have seen Isocrates claiming Athenian heroes as 
orators on grounds of barest probability and Cicero following 
him with a similar list of orators about whom he uses exactly 

ΣΤ, 9, 37 (Antonius objects to Crassus’ view of the value of oratory): 
Quid? in Numa Pompilio, quid? in Servio Tullio, quid? in ceteris regibus, 
quorum multa sunt eximia ad constituendam rem publicam, num elo- 
quentiae vestigium apparet? Quid? exactis regibus, tametsi ipsam 


exactionem mente, non lingua perfectam L. Bruti esse cernimus, sed dein- 
ceps omnia nonne plena consiliorum, inania verborum videmus? 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 33 


the same line of argument that Isocrates uses. He then 
adapts this to Roman oratory and makes similar claims on 
the basis of similar evidence in regard to them. This parallel- 
ism between Isocrates and Cicero leads us to the conclusion 
that Cicero is using Isocrates as his authority. 

This view is strengthened if we contrast other treatments of 
the history of oratory, e. g., Quintilian (Inst. Orat., X, 1, 76 ff.; 
cf. III, 1, 12) gives a wholly orthodox list of orators. He does 
not include even Pericles. 

In other writers we find a varied treatment of the oratorical 
ability of these men, according as the author inclines to one 
side or the other of the conflict between rhetoric and phi- 
losophy. Plutarch, to be sure, relates the story about The- 
mistocles’ composing and rehearsing speeches while the other 
boys were playing. But in the same chapter he goes out of 
his way to deny the influences of rhetoric on Themistocles. 
After denying the statement of Stesimbrotus that Themisto- 
cles had studied with Anaxagoras, he proceeds to form a 
school for Mnesiphilus? whom he makes the master of The- 
mistocles. Mnesiphilus, according to Plutarch, was not a 
ῥήτωρ, NOT a φυσικὸς φιλόσοφος, but a teacher of the wisdom, 
so-called, which was skill in politics and practical sagacity. 
In this he was the successor of Solon. His successors associ- 
ated it with the forensic arts and transferred their sphere of 
activity from public affairs to speaking. These were called 
sophists.2 Now, whether Mnesiphilus is an invention of the 
detractors of Themistocles, as Macan thinks,‘ or an actual 

1 Plut. Themistocles, II (112). 

2 Perrin, Plutarch’s Themistocles and Aristides, p. 180. 

ἃ Plut. Themist., 11 (112): μᾶλλον οὖν ἄν τις προσέχοι τοῖς Μνησιφίλου τὸν 
Θεμιστοκλέα τοῦ Φρεαρρίου ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι λέγουσιν, οὔτε ῥήτορος ὄντος οὔτε 
τῶν φυσικῶν κληθέντων φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ τὴν καλουμένην σοφίαν, οὖσαν δὲ δεινότητα 
πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν, ἐπιτήδευμα πεποιημένου καὶ διασώζοντος ὥσπερ 
αἵρεσιν ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος ἣν οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα δικανικαῖς μίξαντες τέχναις 
καὶ μεταγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπὶ τοὺς. λόγους, σοφισταὶ προσ- 


ηγορεύθησαν. 
‘ Note on Herod., VIII, 57. 


34 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


personage, the purpose of Plutarch in this passage is plain. 
He is emphasizing the point that Themistocles was free from 
the influence of the rhetoricians. The statement that the 
connection between πολιτικὴ δεινότης and λόγοι was not made 
until after the time of Themistocles could not have come from 
an author like Cicero who was following Isocrates. 

The attempt to claim Themistocles as the product of some 
school was a very old one, and probably antedated Isocrates.! 
At least Thucydides seems to have some such story in mind 
in the tribute to Themistocles in I, 138. He emphasizes the 
natural ability of Themistocles (οἰκείᾳ ξυνέσει----ᾳύσεως δυνάμει), 
apparently with the intention of refuting the slanders of 
Stesimbrotus. The same question is raised in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia (IV, 2, 2): πυνθανομένου τινὸς πότερον Θεμιστοκλῆς 
διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν ἢ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν 
πολιτῶν. . . 

But it would be apart from my main purpose to pursue this 
point any further. More important for the particular subject 
in hand is the fact that Thucydides in his summary of the 
virtues of Themistocles makes no mention of his oratorical 
ability. Similarly in Xen. Mem., II, 6, 13, Themistocles is 
contrasted with Pericles, and the possession of wonderful 
oratory is denied him.2 In the Symposium Themistocles, 
Pericles and Solon are noticed but without mention of λόγος. 

These passages from Quintilian, Plutarch, Thucydides and 
Xenophon serve to show the way Themistocles was regarded 
by a writer not an Isocratean. I shall now give some examples 
to show the influence of the views of Isocrates. 

1 The stories may have started with Stesimbrotus (v. Perrin, pp. 32, 


33) and have been attempts to malign him, but the intent of such accounts 


as that furnished by Plutarch is quite different. 


ate... ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίσταιτο, ἃς ἔπᾳδων τῇ πόλει 


” ΦΘεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν φιλεῖν 


ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὑτόν. 
αὑτόν; “Ma Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔπάδων, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν airy.” 

8 Xen. Symp., VIII, 39: . . . σκεπτέον μέν σοι ποῖα ἐπιστάμενος Θεμιστοκλῆς 
ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖά ποτε εἰδὼς Περικλῆς 
κράτιστος ἐδόκει τῇ πατρίδι σύμβουλος εἶναι, ἀθρητέον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε Σόλων 
φιλοσοφήσας νόμους κρατίστους τῇ πόλει κατέθηκεν. . .. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 35 


The Oratio Funebris ascribed to Lysias is generally ac- 
knowledged to be spurious. Blass! recognizes a close relation 
between it and the Panegyricus of Isocrates. It is not sur- 
prising, then, to find an additional resemblance between the 
judgment of the Ps. Lysias on Themistocles, and that ex- 
pressed by Isocrates. [Lys.] II, 42: Θεμιστοκλέα, ἱκανώτατον 
εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι καὶ πρᾶξαι (= rhetoric, philosophy, states- 
manship). 

Nicolaus Sophista is very clearly following the Isocratean 
view in his Encomium Themistoclis. W., I, 338: εἰ μὲν οὖν 
Θεμιστοκλῆς μόνα κατορθοῦν τὰ πολέμου δεινός, λόγῳ δὲ μὴ καθειστήκει 
δεινότερος, οὐδὲν ἂν προὔργου ἦν τὰ Θεμιστοκλέους διεξελθεῖν: νῦν 
δὲ τὰ ἐν καιρῷ κομιεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ἐπίσης ὅπλα μελετήσας καὶ 
λόγους. 

And at the end of the Encomium, W., I, 340: ἦν πάντα 
ἡμῖν τὰ Θεμιστοκλέους διεξελθεῖν, εἰ λόγων ἰσχὺς κατὰ Θεμιστοκλέα 
παρῆν. 

Maximus Planudes includes Themistocles and Miltiades in a 
list of orator-statesmen. W., V, 214: πέντε εἰσὶ ῥητορικαί, 
μία μὲν ἡ πρώτη Kal κυριωτάτη ἡ ἀντίστροφος τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἧ 
ἐχρήσατο Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων, . .. δευτέρα ἡ 
ἀντίστροφος τῇ πολιτικῇ ἧς ἡγήσαντο Μιλτιάδης καὶ Κίμων καὶ 
Θεμιστοκλῆς: οὗτοι γὰρ μηδὲν συγγραφόμενοι ἐπολιτεύοντο. Cf.a 
similar statement in Doxapater, Prol. ad Rhet., W., VI, 24. 
We have much the same statement in Sopater, Prol. ad Aristid. 
(ed. Jebb., vol. I) τρεῖς φοραὶ ῥητόρων γεγόνασιν: ὧν ἡ μὲν πρώτη 
ἀγράφως ἔληγεν, ἧς ἐστι Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ οἱ κατ᾽ 
ἐκείνους ῥήτορες. 

I have selected Themistocles for this detailed treatment 
because he alone of the statesmen mentioned by Isocrates is 
noticed by other writers in such a way as to afford a satis- 
factory comparison. So far as I have observed, no writers 

1 Attische Beredsamkeit, I?, pp. 438-447. According to Wilamowitz 


(Hermes, 35 (1900), p. 30) the oration was inserted in the Lysianic corpus 
about the beginning of the third century. 


36 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


notice oratorical ability in Solon or Clisthenes.! An interest- 
ing parallel to Isocrates’ list of statesmen-orators is afforded 
us by Plato in the Gorgias (503 ff.). After Socrates has 
gained from Callicles the admission that there are two kinds 
of rhetoric, one mere flattery (κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγο- 
pta), the other noble (τὸ 6’ ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως 
ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί), he asks Callicles to 
name an example of the latter kind of rhetoric. Callicles 
knows of no contemporaneous ῥήτωρ who satisfies the con- 
ditions, but claims that Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and 
Pericles possessed the noble rhetoric (σοῦ ο: KAA. Τί δέ; 
Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ 
Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ 
ἀκήκοας; ΒΙ56: ΣΏ. . . . εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ 
πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, 
Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. KAA. ’’ Eyot- 
ve). Socrates then shows that the citizens were worse when 
these statesmen retired from public life than when they 
entered it, moreover that Themistocles, Cimon and Muiltiades 
had suffered at the hands of the populace they tried to control. 
Consequently they possessed neither the noble nor the flatter- 
ing rhetoric. (517A: εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ 
ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο---οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον---οὔτε τῇ κολακικῃ.) A 
more complete negation οἱ Isocrates’ theories it would be hard 
to find. Plato not only denies that the statesmen possessed 
any ῥητορική, but ascribes the corruption of Athens to the 
men whom Isocrates makes her greatest heroes. It is highly 
probable that Isocrates had this attack of Plato’s in his mind 
when he wrote the passages in the Antidosis dealing with these 
statesmen.? 


Both writers speak of the value of oratory in promoting good 


1 Plutarch (Cimon, 4) and Nepos (Cimon, 2, 1) imply that Cimon was 
not distinguished as an orator. 

2 Cf. Nestle in Philologus, LXX (= XXIV), 1911, p. 11. For the dis- 
cussion of these men in Aristides, v. Chap. 4. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 37 


morals. Isocrates, Ant., 255: τούτῳ (1. 6., λόγῳ), καὶ τοὺς 
κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐγκωμιάζομεν. 
διὰ τούτου τοὺς τ᾽ ἀνοήτους παιδεύομεν καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δοκιμάζομεν. 

Similarly Cicero, De Orat., II, 9, 35: Quis cohortari ad 
virtutem ardentius, quis a vitiis acrius revocare, quis vituperare 
improbos asperius, quis laudare bonos ornatius . . . potest? 

Isocrates, Ant., 60: ἐνθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ δοκῶ 
τοῖς λόγοις διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπειν 
ἔπ᾽ ἀρετήν... .. 

Ant., 67: . .. πάντες οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην 
συντείνουσιν. 

Απί., 84: ᾿λλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιο- 
σύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ xp7- 
σιμώτεροι φανεῖμεν ὄντες. | 

In the Brutus (6, 23) we have these words: . . . dicendi 
autem me non tam fructus et gloria quam studium ipsum 
exercitatioque delectat. . . . Dicere enim bene nemo potest, 
nisi qui prudenter intellegit. Quare qui eloquentiae verae 
dat operam, dat prudentiae, qua ne maximis quidem in bellis 
aequo animo carere quisquam potest. 

Here we see emphasis laid on the benefits produced by 
rhetoric on the speaker himself. This view, that speaking 
improves the character, we find as one of the fundamental 
principles of Isocrates’ system. This is best presented in 
Ant., 277: ἔπειτα τῶν πράξεων τῶν συντεινουσῶν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν 
ἐκλέξεται τὰς πρεπωδεστάτας καὶ μάλιστα συμφερούσας: ὁ δὲ τὰς 
τοιαύτας συνεθιζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὸν 
ἐνεστῶτα λόγον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τὴν αὐτὴν ἕξει 
ταύτην δύναμιν, ὥσθ᾽ ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται 
τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. 

In this passage Isocrates is telling how the study of oratory 
serves to make men αὑτῶν βελτίους. . . καὶ πλείονος ἀξίους. 
The orator in his search for material will acquire the habits of 
thought which will make him superior to his fellows in action 
as well asinspeech. We see that in both Cicero and Isocrates 


38 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


the same result follows: τὸ λέγειν εὖ (= eloquentia) brings 
with it τὸ φρονεῖν (= prudentia). 


Both Isocrates and Cicero defend not only the practice of 
oratory but the teaching of it as well. Isocrates rebukes the 
inconsistency of those who admire oratory but condemn the 
study of it. 

Ant., 246: ζηλοῦσι τοὺς καλῶς χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ δυναμένους, 
ἐπιτιμῶσι δὲ τῶν νεωτέρων τοῖς τυχεῖν ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς βουλομένοις. 
κτὰ. . .. (249) ὃ δ᾽ οὐ μόνον ταραχῆς σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς 
περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀλιγωρίας: τὴν μὲν γὰρ Πειθὼ μίαν τῶν θεῶν νομίζουσιν 
εἶναι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶσι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θυσίαν αὐτῇ 
ποιουμένην, τοὺς δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἧς ἡ θεὸς ἔχει μετασχεῖν βουλομένους 
ὡς κακοῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμοῦντας διαφθείρεσθαί φασιν. 

The Athenians get their supremacy from their superior 
education. Therefore all ought to favor the culture of the 
mind—the highest of human pursuits. Ant., 293: αὐτοὶ 
προέχετε Kal διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων. .. τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν 
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄμεινον πεπαιδεῦσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. (302)... 
περὶ δὲ τὴν παιδείαν ἅπαντες ἂν ἡμᾶς πρωτεύειν προκρίνειαν. (304) 
ἣν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τῆς μὲν ταραχῆς παύσεσθε ταὐτης, . . . προ- 
τρέψετε τῶν νεωτέρων τοὺς βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους καὶ σχολὴν ἄγειν 
δυναμένους ἐπὶ τὴν παιδείαν καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν τὴν τοιαύτην. 

Similarly Cicero (Orator, 41, 142): Nam si vitiosum est dicere 
ornate, pellatur omnino e civitate eloquentia; sin ea non 
modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam iuvat universam rem 
publicam, cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est 
aut quod posse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere ? 


The objection may be raised that while Cicero resembles 
Isocrates in these passages, the resemblance is due not to the 
fact that Cicero followed Isocrates, but that both copied 
earlier writers, Gorgias and Protagoras. Nestle! has shown 
that many of Isocrates’ ideas were not original with him, but 
merely adaptations of the work of older sophists. Of the 


1 Philologus, LXX (= XXIV), 1911, pp. 1 ff. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 39 


ideas that we have found common to Isocrates and Cicero 
that of the origin of civilization is derived by Isocrates from 
Gorgias or Protagoras or both.! But a study of the passages 
in which Cicero mentions Gorgias and Protagoras reveals 
hardly more than a possibility that Cicero was acquainted 
with the writings of these sophists. There is nothing in his 
treatment of these men which shows that Cicero felt for them 
the admiration which he felt for Isocrates, nor is there any 
passage in which Cicero definitely quotes from Gorgias or 
Protagoras, as he does from Isocrates. I consider it, there- 
fore, highly improbable that Cicero went further back than 
Isocrates for his point of view. 


SUMMARY 


I have shown Isocratean influence in Cicero’s theory that 
the orator should be able to speak on any subject but need 
know but little of the details of the subject about which he 
speaks; that the orator is the source from which flow all the 
forces that produce civilization and government; that the 
orator is the best statesman, and also a teacher of morals; 
furthermore that his profession is so honorable as to lend 
dignity even to the teaching of it. These ideas form the 
background of the De Oratore and Orator. On this Cicero 
puts the details of his picture, drawing them probably from 
many sources. In pointing out the underlying Isocratean 
elements in the Ciceronian works I hope I have shown the 
futility of attempting to assign any one contemporaneous 

1 Philologus, LX X (= XXIV), 1911, pp. 11 ff.; 24 ff. To Nestle’s account 
of the passages showing the influence of Gorgias on Isocrates should be added 
the following: Gorgias thought that every subject could best be treated 
by the orator. Cic. De Inv., I, 5, 7: Nam Gorgias Leontinus, antiquissi- 


mus fere rhetor, omnibus de rebus oratorem optime posse dicere existi- 
mavit. This statement Cicero probably drew from Plato’s Gorgias, 457A: 


δυνατὸς μὲν yap πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ Kal περὶ παντὸς λέγειν. I have 
shown above (pp. 230 ἢ.) that this universality of subject is one of the 
characteristics of Isocrates, which we may now put down as part of his 


debt to Gorgias. 


40 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES 


rhetorician or philosopher as the source for Cicero’s work.! 
The limitations of this treatise do not permit me to discuss 
the theories of von Arnim? who thinks Cicero utilized Philo, 
or Kroll’ who opposes von Arnim and finds traces of the 
influence of Antiochus. These I hope to take up later in a 
discussion of the sources of the De Oratore. 


1 De Inv., II, 3, 8, seems to imply that Cicero had been anticipated in 
his union of the Isocratean and Aristotelian systems. But the language 
is too indefinite to permit us to identify the persons referred to by postert- 
oribus. At any rate the last sentence of the section (quos ipsos simul 
atque illos superiores nos nobis omnes, quoad facultas tulit, proposuimus) 
clearly indicates that Cicero did not merely draw upon a compilator, but 
went to the original sources. 

2 Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, pp. 97 ff. 

ὃ Rhein. Mus. 58 (1903), 552 ff. Cf. Ammon in Jahresbericht, 126 


(1905), 169 f. 


DIONYSUS rn ALI CAR NSA SS: US 


In Dionysius of Halicarnassus we find another exponent of 
the doctrines of Isocrates. Dionysius, like Cicero, supports 
the union of philosophy and rhetoric under the leadership of 
rhetoric, and, like Cicero, he has two enemies to face: on one 
side the rhetoricians who denied the value of philosophy and 
. in fact all forms of liberal education;? on the other side the 
philosophers who attempted to claim all that was good in 
rhetoric as the work of philosophy. He resembled Cicero 
also in opposing the narrow conception of Atticism that was 
put forward with vigor at that time. Chapter 52 of the De 
Thucydide is undoubtedly aimed at the same school of 
Atticists that Cicero attacked.‘ This school, while calling 
themselves ‘‘ Attici,’’ restricted themselves so closely in the 
choice of models as to arouse the just anger of Cicero. Lysias 
and Thucydides were the authors whom they proposed to 
imitate. Between the Atticism of this school and the 
Atticism of Dionysius there is a vast difference. In fact the 
use of the same term to describe both movements, while 
apparently unavoidable, is apt to lead to confusion of thought. 
Dionysius as an Atticist strove to imitate the best in a wide 
range of Greek authors. His classical period does not end 
till Demosthenes, whom he considers the greatest of the 
Attic orators. The same statement holds true of Cicero. 

1 De Orat. Ant., I (445): ἡ ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορική. 

Ad Pomp., 1 (757): τῆς φιλοσόφου ῥητορικῆς. 6 (784): τὴν φιλόσοφον 
PNTOPLKHY. 

? De Orat. Ant., I (446): ἑτέρα δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνης παρελθοῦσα τάξιν, 
ἀφόρητος ἀναιδείᾳ θεατρικῇ καὶ ἀνάγωγος καὶ οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδεύ- 
ματος οὐδενὸς peretAnguta ἐλευθερίου. : 

8Ep. Ad Amm., 2 (722): τοῦτο δὴ πεποίηκα, βέλτιστε ᾿Αμμαῖε, τῆς τε 
ἀληθείας προνοούμενος, . . . καὶ τῆς ἁπάντων τῶν wept τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους 
ἐσπουδακότων χάριτος: ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπολάβωσιν, ὅτι πάντα περιείληφεν ἡ 
περιπατητικὴ φιλοσοφία τὰ ῥητορικὰ παραγγέλματα. 


4 Brut., 285, 287; Or., 32.. Cf. Schmid, Atticismus, I, p. 7, n. 9. 
41 


42 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


Hence it is plain that Cicero and Dionysius belong together 
as the representatives of Atticism in the broad sense of the 
word. 

But their study of Attic models brought them something 
more than principles of style. Such a course might, indeed, 
have produced a style purer than that of the contemporary 
Asianic orators, and fuller and richer than that affected by the 
Roman Attici. It would, however, hardly have raised them 
above the level of the ordinary rhetoricians. The distinctive 
part of their system is the combination of rhetoric and phi- 
losophy, and in this Dionysius takes as his models the older 
rhetoricians of whom Isocrates was the best example! But 
Dionysius is a generation later than Cicero, and the lapse of a 
generation has brought large changes in the field of rhetoric. 
The revival of the old sophistical ideal has gone far enough to 
make such a defense and reconstruction as Cicero gives us 
quite unnecessary.?. Dionysius does not argue in favor of his 
theory, but his attitude toward the whole subject of rhetoric 
reveals the avowed Isocratean. Another reason for the 
difference between Dionysius and Cicero lies in the nature of 
their treatises. In a critical treatise on style there is not the 
room for a discussion of the purposes and aims of oratory 
such as we find in Cicero.2 Consequently, we shall find in 

1The introduction to the treatise Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων, passim; 
also in the chapter on Isocrates, 4 (543): καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας 
οὐχὶ μέρος τι τῆς πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλ᾽ ὅλην αὐτὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦτον ἔχειν 
τὸν ῥήτορα διὰ χειρός. καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ τὸ 
θεωρητικὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸπρακτικόν, μηδ᾽ ἀφ ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυπον 
ἕξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακελευσαίμην 
ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι προαίρεσιν. 

Cf. Christ-Schmid, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur, II, 1 (5th 
ed.), p. 356: Das rhetorische System, das seinen Schriften zugrunde liegt, 
stellt ein nicht sehr klares Kompromiss aus platonischen, isokratischen, 
peripatetischen (aristotelischen und theophrastischen) und_ stoischen 
Elementen dar. 

2 De Orat. Ant., 2, 3 (447-449). 


2A closer parallel to Cicero could probably be established if we had 


the lost treatise Ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τοὺς κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς 
ἀδίκως. De Thuc., 2 (814). 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 43 


Dionysius little that discusses directly the ideals of oratory 
presented by Isocrates, but we must arrive at his point of view 
rather by consideration ofhis general attitude toward rhetoric, 
and by utilizing hints that he drops here and there. 

It is in the preface to the treatise On the Ancient Orators 
that we find the fullest account of the ideal rhetoric. There 
Dionysius sketches briefly the vicissitudes through which 
φιλόσοφος ῥητορική has passed. I give a summary of his 
account. 

‘Our age is an age of improvement in many respects; particu- 
larly because the practice of ‘“‘ political oratory’ (τῆς περὶ 
τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἐπιμελείας) has increased. For the old 
philosophic rhetoric (ἡ ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ) decayed 
after the time of Alexander, and almost disappeared. Into 
its place there came a usurper, partaking neither of phi- 
losophy nor any other liberal study.!. This deceived the 
people and appropriated the offices in the state that belonged 
to the philosophic rhetoric. So the Attic Muse was deposed 
from her rightful position by a barbarian stranger. But time 
has restored the old sound rhetoric and expelled the usurper. 
We ought to be glad that the change has been so rapid. It 
has spread to all except a few Asiatic cities. The change has 
been due to Rome and the wisdom of her rulers, under whose 
guidance sound wisdom (τὸ φρόνιμον): has increased, and folly 
has been compelled to learn sense. Therefore the present 
age is producing histories, political and philosophical treatises 
in large numbers. The interest in empty oratory will hardly 

1 Compare the remarks of Crassus on the appearance of Latint magistri 
dicendi in Rome, Cicero De Orat., III, 24, 93: Verborum eligendorum et 
conlocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione 
ipsa exercitatio; rerum est silva magna, quam cum Graeci iam non tenerent, 
ob eamque causam iuventus nostra dedisceret paene discendo, etiam 
Latini, si dis placet, hoc biennio magistri dicendi exstiterunt; quos ego 
censor edicto meo sustuleram, non quo, ut nescio quos dicere aiebant, acui 
ingenia adulescentium nollem, sed contra ingenia obtundi nolui, cor- 
roborari impudentiam. 


2Compare Isocrates’ φρονεῖν, φρόνησις, φρόνιμος in connection with 
λέγειν. 


44 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


last more than a generation. My purpose in this treatise is 
to explain which of the ancient orators are most valuable to 
those pursuing political philosophy (rots ἀσκοῦσι τὴν πολιτικὴν 
φιλοσοφίαν)." 

There are several points in this passage that show the 
influence of Isocrates. In the first place the ἀρχαία καὶ 
φιλόσοφος ῥητορική which he later calls σώφρων can be none 
other than the system of which Isocrates was the best expo- 
nent.!. The content of the adjective φιλόσοφος applied to rhet- 
oric can best be explained by comparing De Isoc., 4 (543, 544): 
καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μὴ TO 
θεωρητικὸνΣ αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, μηδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν 
αὐτὸς ἄλυπον ἕξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς ὠὧφε- 
λήσει, παρακελευσαίμην ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος μιμεῖσθαι 
προαίρεσιν. This is exactly Isocrates’ attitude toward phi- 
losophy, as we have seen from such passages as Antidosis, 180 
ff.,271; Adv. Soph., 2-8; Ant., 262; Panath., 26. Asimilar use 
of the word φιλοσοφία and related words appears elsewhere in 
this passage. In chapter 2 (447) the men who have brought 
about the restoration of the true rhetoric are called τοὺς 
συμφιλοσοφοῦντας ἀνθρώπους. In chapter 4 (450) the study of 
the ancient orators is said to be necessary to those ἀσκοῦσι τὴν 
πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Dionysius also wrote in defence of 
“political philosophy.’ (De Thuc., 2 (814) . . . πραγμα- 
τείας, ἣν συνεταξάμην ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τοὺς 
κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς ἀδίκως.) This πολιτικὴ φιλοσοφία can 

1 The contest between Dionysius and the Asian school was not merely 
over style. It was a contest of φιλόσοφος ῥητορική against ἀναίδεια θεατρικὴ 
οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδεύματος οὐδενὸς μετειληφυῖα, 1. 6., Of learning 
against ignorance. v. Kaibel in Hermes, XX (1885), 509, who has noticed 
this connection between Isocrates and Dionysius. v. also Rohde in Rh. 
Mus., XLI (1886), 175. 

2In Ant. Rom., II, 21, 1, he adopts the same attitude toward the 
philosophy which is only theoretical. ’AAX’ ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων (4. e., the 
meaning of myths) rots αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ θεωρητικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος ἀπο- 


τετμημένοις ἀφείσθω σκοπεῖν, τῆς δ᾽ ὑπὸ ἹΡωμύλου κατασταθείσης πολιτείας καὶ 
τάδε ἡγησάμην ἱστορίας ἄξια. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 45 


hardly be anything except rhetoric regarded from the Iso- 
cratean standpoint as a preparation for public life.1 

We have also seen that Isocrates considered his course as 
the best preparation for public life. Dionysius holds the same 
view. One of the wrongs done by the usurping rhetoric was 
that it deprived the “ philosophic rhetoric’”’ of the leader- 
ship in the state which was its lawful possession. De Orat. 
Ant., I (446): ἑτέρα δέ Tis . . . τὰς τιμὰς Kal τὰς προστασίας 
τῶν πόλεων, ἃς ἔδει τὴν φιλόσοφον ἔχειν, εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀνηρτήσατο. 

It is interesting to notice the variety of results that have 
come from the rehabilitation of the ἀρχαία ῥητορική. 

De Orat. Ant., 4 (449): τοιγάρτοι πολλαὶ μὲν ἱστορίαι σπουδῆς 
ἄξιαι ypadgovTar τοῖς νῦν, πολλοὶ δὲ λόγοι πολιτικοὶ χαρίεντες 
ἐκφέρονται φιλόσοφοί τε συντάξεις οὐ μὰ Δία εὐκαταφρόνητοι ἄλλαι 
τε πολλαὶ καὶ καλαὶ πραγματεῖαι καὶ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ “Ἑλλησιν εὖ 
μάλα διεσπουδασμέναι προεληλύθασί τε καὶ προελεύσονται κατὰ τὸ 
εἰκός. It is difficult to say to what works Dionysius here 
refers. Egger (Denys d’Halicarnasse, p. 42) suggests that by 
ἱστορίαι he means the work of Diodorus Siculus, and by λόγοι 
πολιτικοί and φιλόσοφοι συντάξεις the rhetorical and philosophical 
works of Cicero—a conjecture which is very tempting in view 

1Cf. De Isoc., I (534): ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἀνὴρ ἐγένετο, φιλοσοφίας 
ἐπεθύμησε. 

De Isoc., 1 (537): πλοῦτον ὅσον οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας χρηματισαμένων 
περιποιησάμενος. 

De Isoc., 12 (558): κατὰ δὲ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τὸ φιλόσο- 
φον τῆς προαιρέσεως. 

Ibid., ὅσοι φιλοσόφως τοῦ μαθήματος τούτου (ῥητορικῆς) προέστησαν. 

Ad Pomp., 4 (777): πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἐξελέξατο 
καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ ἀνδρὶ φιλοσόφῳ προσηκούσας. 

The discussion of political questions, according to Dionysius, belongs 
to the orator rather than the philosopher. In speaking of Plato’s failure 
in writing on such subjects he says (De Dem., 23, 1025, 1026), κἀμοί γε 


πολλάκις ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων αὐτοῦ λόγων, ὃ πεποίηται wap’ ‘Oujnpw 
πρὸς τὴν ᾿Αφροδίτην ὁ Ζεὺς λέγων" 


Οὔ τοι, τέκνον ἐμόν, δέδοται πολεμήια ἔργα, 
ἀλλὰ σὺ γ᾽ ἱμερόεντα μετέρχεο ἔργα γάμοιο 


Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων, ταῦτα δὲ πολιτικοῖς καὶ ῥήτορσιν ἀνδράσι μελήσει. 


46 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


of the close connection that exists between Cicero and Di- 
onysius in general principles. It is more probable, however, 
that the reference is to the works of some of the archaizing 
school contemporary with Dionysius, e. g., the histories and 
speeches of Messalla. The benefits of the ‘‘ philosophic 
rhetoric’ as here presented are not so far reaching as those 
described by Isocrates, but the difference is one of quantity 
rather than quality. In both writers rhetoric is the basis 
for sound work in other spheres. 

In chapter 4 (450) Dionysius describes the subject that he 
has chosen: ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ λόγου κοινὴν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ 
πλεῖστα δυναμένην ὠρελῆσαι λαβών. This meets the demands 
of Isocrates, Ant., 276: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ λέγειν ἢ γράφειν προαι- 
ρούμενος λόγους ἀξίους ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποιήσεται τὰς 
ὑποθέσεις ἀδίκους ἢ μικρὰς ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων ἀλλὰ μεγάλας 
καὶ καλὰς Kal φιλανθρώπου ς καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων. 

We have seen in the introduction to the treatise De Oratori- 
bus Antiquis indications that Dionysius was a follower of 
Isocrates. This is plainly stated in the essay on Isocrates. In 
chapter I he sketches Isocrates’ career. The material is 
almost entirely from Isocrates’ own works. The significant 
point for us is that he accepts Isocrates’ claim to be more 
than a common rhetorician. I give the most important 
portions. 

I (535): ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ δόξης καὶ τοῦ πρωτεῦσαι παρὰ τοῖς “Ἑλλησιν 
ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καθάπερ αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν, ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν ἃ διανοηθείη 
κατέφυγεν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν 
ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν τότε σοφιστῶν, περὶ 
δὲ τῶν ᾿Ελληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν «, καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων.» ,2 ἐξ 
ὧν ὑπελάμβανε τάς τε πόλεις ἄμεινον οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας 
ἐπίδοσιν ἕξειν πρὸς ἀρετήν. 

His great service was to reform rhetoric and make it prac- 
tical. 

1Cf. De Demosth., 51 (1112): ὁρῶν γε δὴ τούτους τοὺς θαυμαζομένους ἐπὶ 


σοφίᾳ καὶ κρατίστων λόγων ποιητὰς νομιζομένους Ἰσοκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα. 


2 Panath., 11; cf. Ant., 46. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 47 


I (536): πεφυρμένην τε παραλαβὼν τὴν ἄσκησιν τῶν λόγων ὑπὸ 
τῶν περὶ Τοργίαν καὶ Πρωταγόραν σοφιστῶν πρῶτος ἐχώρησεν ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ φυσικῶν, ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν 
σπουδάζων τὴν ἐπιστήμην διετέλεσεν, ἐξ ἧς, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, τὸ 
βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν τὰ συμφέροντα 
παραγίνεται τοῖς μαθοῦσιν.3 

He recognizes Isocrates as the most famous man of his 
time; I (536): ἐπιφανέστατος δὲ γενόμενος τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
ἀκμασάντων χρόνον. 

He also notes the variety of pursuits which the pupils of 
Isocrates followed; I (536): of μὲν ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς ἔγένοντο 
ἄριστοι λόγοις, of δ᾽ ἐν τῷ πολιτεύεσθαι Kal τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν 
διήνεγκαν, [καὶ] ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς κοινὰς τῶν ᾿Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων 
πράξεις ἀνέγραψαν. 

The nobility of subject in the works of Isocrates which 
Dionysius alludes to in the first chapter, he takes up at great 
length beginning with chapter four and continuing through 
chapter ten. This passage, comprising more than a quarter 
of the whole treatise, is the more remarkable because in the 
criticisms of the other orators the subject matter is touched 
on but lightly, or wholly ignored, and the treatise is devoted 
almost entirely to a discussion of style. On the style of 
Isocrates, however, he does not have so much to say, nor does 
he always speak of it with approval. For the subject matter 
he has nothing but the most fulsome praise. In Dionysius’ 
opinion Isocrates provides in his orations the best of instruc- 
tion in ethics and politics, and surpasses the philosophers in 
their own field. I give below the passages from chapters four 
to ten bearing on this subject: 

4 (543): . .. ὅσα περὶ τὴν πραγματικὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ 
πολλῷ μείζονά ἐστι παρ᾽ ᾿Ισοκράτει καὶ κρείττονα, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἡ 
προαίρεσις ἡ τῶν λόγων, περὶ οἣς ἐσπούδαζε, καὶ τῶν ὑποθέσεων τὸ 
κάλλος, ἐν αἷς ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διατριβάς. ἐξ ὧν οὐ λέγειν δεινοὺς μόνον 
ἀπεργάσαιτ᾽ ἂν τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτῷ τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἤθη 


1Cf. Isoc. Hel., 1-5, and p. 10. Panath., 26 ff. 
2 ΡΟ rN 2: Δη 255 tee 27 kite ana! Dana; 


48 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


σπουδαίους, οἴκῳ τε καὶ πόλει καὶ ὅλῃ TH Ἑλλάδι χρησί- 
μους. κράτιστα γὰρ δὴ παιδεύματα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς ᾿Ισοκράτους 
ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν λόγοις. καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι χρῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας οὐχὶ μέρος 
τι τῆς πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλ᾽ ὅλην αὐτὴν κτήσασθαι τοῦτον ἔχειν 
τὸν ῥήτορα διὰ χειρός. καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν, 
μὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν αὐτῆς μόνον ἀγαπῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, 
μηδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἄλυπον ἕξει βίον, ταῦτα προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν 
πολλοὺς ὠφελήσει, παρακελευσαίμην ἂν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ ῥήτορος 
μιμεῖσθαι προαίρεσιν. 

5 (544): τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο φιλόπολίς τε καὶ φιλόδημος ἢ 
τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτηδεύσειε τὴν πολιτικὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀναγνοὺς αὐτοῦ 
τὸν ἸΠανηγυρικόν; ἐν ῳ διεξιὼν κτλ. 

6 (546): τίς δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἀγαπήσειε μέγεθος ἔχων ἀνὴρ καὶ δυνάμεώς 
τινος ἡγούμενος, ἃ πρὸς Φίλιππον αὐτῷ τὸν Μακεδόνα γέγραπται; ἐν 
οἷς ἀξιοῖ κτλ. 

6 (547): πολλὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκοντας ταῦτα 
δυνάστας φρονήματός τε μείζονος ὑποπίμπλασθαι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν 
τῆς ἀρετῆς. 

(547): τίς δὲ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν 
προτρέψαιτοἥ καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τε ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὰς πόλεις ὅλας 
τοῦ Ilepi τῆς εἰρήνης λόγου; ἐν γὰρ δὴ τούτῳ κτλ. 

ἡ (549): τούτων γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ εἴ τις ἂν ἢ βελτίους ἢ ἀληθεστέρους 
ἢ μᾶλλον πρέποντας φιλοσοφίᾳ δύναιτο λόγους εἰπεῖν. 

8 (540): τίς δὲ τὸν ᾿Αρεοπαγιτικὸν ἀναγνοὺς λόγον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο 
κοσμιώτερος, ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειε τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος; ὃς 
ἐτόλμησε διαλεχθῆναι κτλ. 

9 (551): τίς δ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον πείσειε καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἄνδρας τοῦ 
ῥήτορος πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους 
γραφέντι λόγῳ, ὃς ἐπιγράφεται μὲν ᾿Αρχίδαμος, κτλ. 

9 (554): ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ Λακεδαιμονίοις μόνοις συμβουλεύειν φαίην 

Cf: Isoc. ἜΡΙΝ 2; Ant:, 278; and p. 3. 

2 Cf. Isocrates’ praise of the Panegyricus in Ant., 60: ἐνθυμήθητε δὲ πρὸς 
ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, εἰ δοκῶ τοῖς λόγοις διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀλλὰ μὴ προτρέπειν ἐπ᾽ 
ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνους. 


’Cf. what Isocrates says about this oration in Ant., 65: ... ἐπί τε 
τὴν δικαιοσύνην παρακαλῶ. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 49 


ἂν αὐτὸν ἔγωγε ἀλλὰ Kal Tots ἄλλοις “Ἑλλησι καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις 
πολλῷ κρεῖττον ἁπάντων φιλοσόφων, οἱ τέλος ποιοῦνται 
τοῦ βίου τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλόν. 

IO (555): ἔχων δὲ πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλους διεξιέναι λόγους 
πρὸς πόλεις τε καὶ δυνάστας καὶ ἰδιώτας γὙραφέντας, ὧν ot μὲν εἰς 
ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωφροσύνην τὰ πλήθη παρακαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ εἰς μετριότητα 
καὶ νόμιμον ἀρχὴν τοὺς δυνάστας προάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ κοσμίους τῶν 
ἰδιωτῶν ἀπεργάζονται τοὺς βίους, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενοι, 
δεδοικὼς μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ὁ λόγος ἐκμηκυνθῇῃ μοι, ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσω. 

In chapter 12 (558) Isocrates is compared with Lysias. κατὰ 
δὲ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν ὑποθέσεων Kal TO φιλόσοφον 
τῆς προαιρέσεως πλεῖον διαφέρειν (1. €., ᾿Ισοκράτην Λυσίου) 
ἢ παιδὸς ἄνδρα, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων εἴρηκεν, εἰ δὲ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ῥητόρων, ὅσοι φιλοσόφως τοῦ μαθήματος τούτον 


προέστησαν.ἷ 


In the Epistle to Pompeius Geminus we have an illustration 
of the application of this theory to criticism.? In this Epistle 
Dionysius gives his views on Herodotus, Thucydides, Xeno- 
phon, Philistus and Theopompus. He prefers Herodotus to 
Thucydides for a number of reasons, among which the first 
and most important is his greater skill in choosing the subject.® 
Ad Pomp., 3, 2 (767): πρῶτόν τε καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναγκαιότατον 


1 Cf. also 15 (565), where by way of introduction to the quotation from 
the De Pace, he says: διδάσκων ὡς ἔστιν οὐ μόνον κρείττων ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς 
ἀδικίας ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελιμωτέρα. 

2Cf. Christ-Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, II, 1, (5th 
ed.) p. 356 f.: Ganz unter rhetorisch-isokratischem Standpunkt steht seine 
‘Auffassung von der Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers. .. . 

3 Cf. Ε΄ Nassal, Aesthetisch-rhetorische Beziehungen zwischen Dionysius 
von Halicarnassus und Cicero, p. 93: “‘ Das rhetorische Element in ihrer 
Geschichtsauffassung, wie die Ergétzung durch Wahl eines dankbaren 
Stoffes und rhetorisch aufgeputzte Behandlung desselben, ferner die freie 
Stellung des Historikers dem iiberlieferten Stoff gegenuber atmet ganz 
den Geist der von Isocrates inaugurierte Geschichtschreibung.”’ Nassal, 
however, does not show any direct connection between Dionysius and 
Isocrates. 


50 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


ἔργον ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τοῖς γράφουσιν πᾶσιν ἱστορίας ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξασθαι. 
καλὴν καὶ κεχαρισμένην τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις. τοῦτο. 
Ἡρόδοτος κρεῖττόν μοι δοκεῖ πεποιηκέναι Θουκυδίδου: This criticism 
is repeated in De Imit. and De Thuc. 

De Imit., II, 6, 3 (424): τῶν μέντοι συγγραφέων Ἡρόδοτος μὲν 
ἐξείργασται βέλτιον TO πραγματικὸν εἶδος. 

De Thuc., 5 (820): ὁ δ᾽ ‘AXtxapvaceds Ἡρόδοτος, γενόμενος 
ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τῶν Περσικῶν, mapexreivas δὲ μέχρι τῶν ΠΠελοπον- 
νησιακῶν, τὴν τε πραγματικὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐξήνεγκε καὶ 
λαμπρότερον κτλ.2 

In similar style he criticises Xenophon and Philistus. 

Ad Pomp., 4 (777): Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Φίλιστος of τούτοις ἐπακμά- 
σαντες οὔτε φύσεις ὁμοίας εἶχον οὔτε προαιρέσεις. Ξενοφῶν μὲν γὰρ 
Ἡροδότου ζηλωτὴς ἔγένετο Kat’ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς χαρακτῆρας, τόν 
τε πραγματικὸν καὶ τὸν λεκτικόν᾽ πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὰς ὑποθέσεις 
τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἐξελέξατο καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ ἀνδρὶ 
φιλοσόφῳ προσηκούσας. 

Ad Pomp., 5 (779): Φίλιστος δὲ Θουκυδίδῃ μᾶλλον « ἂν» δόξειεν 
ἐοικέναι καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον κοσμεῖσθαι τὸν χαρακτῆρα. οὔτε γὰρ 
ὑπόθεσιν εἴληρε πολυωφελῆ καὶ κοινὴν [ὥσπερ Θουκυδίδης], 
ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ταύτην τοπικήν. 

Theopompus, ‘‘ the most famous of the pupils of Isocrates,’” 
naturally comes in for praise. 

Ad Pomp., 6 (782): Θεόπομπος δὲ Χῖος ἐπιφανέστατος πάντων 
«τῶν» ᾿Ισοκράτους μαθητῶν γενόμενος καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν πανηγυρικούς, 
πολλοὺς δὲ συμβουλευτικοὺς συνταξάμενος λόγους ἐπιστολάς τε τὰς 
Χιακὰς ἐπιγραφομένας καὶ ὑποθήκας ἄλλας λόγου ἀξίας, ἱστορίαν 

1Cf. Isoc. Ad Nic., 48: ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ οὖν φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ 
ποιεῖν ἢ γράφειν τι κεχαρισμένον τοῖς πολλοῖς μὴ τοὺς ὠφελιμωτάτους 
τῶν λόγων ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μυθωδεστάτους. There is a striking similarity 
between the ideals of the two writers—to produce a pleasing work. 

2 His rather unjust judgment on Thucydides is probably influenced by 
his animosity toward the narrow Attici, just as his judgment on Plato is 
warped by the passions of the conflict between philosophers and rhetori- 
cians. 

8 Cf. De Imit., II, 6, 3 (426): ὁ μὲν Ξενοφῶν ‘Hpoddrov ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο 
κατά τε τὰς πραγματικὰς ἀρετάς. ... 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 51 


πεπραγματευμένος ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τῆς ὑποθέσεως 
τῶν ἱστοριῶν (καλαὶ γὰρ ἀμφότεραι... ) rd.) 

Dionysius applies the same principle to his own work in the 
preface to the Antiquitates Romanae. 

I, 1, 2: ἐπείσθην yap ὅτι det τοὺς προαιρουμένους μνημεῖα THs ἑαυτῶν 
ψυχῆς Tots ἐπιγιγνομένοις καταλιπεῖν, . .. Kal πάντων μάλιστα 
τοὺς ἀναγράφοντας ἱστορίας, ἐν αἷς καθιδρῦσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
[πάντες] ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἀρχὴν φρονήσεώς τε καὶ σοφίας οὖσαν, 
πρῶτον μὲν ὑποθέσεις προαιρεῖσθαι καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρε- 
πεῖς καὶ πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις φεροῦύ- 
σις K7X. 

I, 2, 1: τὴν μὲν οὖν ὑπόθεσιν ὅτι καλὴν εἴληφα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ 
πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμον οὐ μακρῶν οἶμαι δεήσειν λόγων τοῖς γε δὴ μὴ 


παντάπασιν ἀπείρως ἔχουσι τῆς κοινῆς ἱστορίας. 


The first Epistle to Ammaeus furnishes us with additional 
evidence of Dionysius’ attitude toward the older rhetoric. 
Some philosophers of the Peripatetic school have put forward 
the claim that Demosthenes gained his oratorical ability from 
the study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Dionysius comes to the 
defence of Demosthenes and proves that the Rhetoric was 
written after most of Demosthenes’ speeches had been de- 
livered and, far from being the source from which Demosthenes 
learned rhetoric, it is a statement of the principles of rhetoric, 
based on a study of Demosthenes and other orators. The 
body of the treatise is concerned with a detailed discussion of 
chronology, and has no bearing on our present purpose. The 
interesting point is that Dionysius undertook the work to 
prove the value of the older school of rhetoric, as contrasted 
with the Peripatetic system, and secondly, to show that 
Demosthenes, the perfect orator, received from Isocrates and 
his pupil Isaeus a training that needed no supplement from 
the work of Aristotle.” 

ECE De τη] t 15.0; 128} 


2 Ad Amm., 2 (722): τοῦτο δὴ πεποίηκα. . . ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπολάβωσιν, ὅτι 
πάντα περιείληφεν ἡ περιπατητικὴ φιλοσοφία τὰ ῥητορικὰ παραγγέλματα, καὶ οὔτε 


52 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


Demosthenes is the consummation of the Isocratean ideal, 
as we shall have occasion to notice in discussing the Pseudo- 
Lucianic Laudatio Demosthenis. Consequently we should 
expect Dionysius to call attention to Isocratean character- 
istics in Demosthenes. But the essay on Demosthenes that 
we possess deals wholly with style, whereas it was the subject 
matter that Dionysius most admired in Isocrates. The 
treatise Περὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος which has 
not been preserved, if indeed it was ever completed,! would 
have contained commendation of Demosthenes from the 
Isocratean standpoint, just as the criticism of the historians 
is Isocratean. As a mere hint of what his judgment would 
have been we have the passage just quoted (De Dem., 58, 
1129) and De Dinarch. 8 (646): λείπεται δὲ Δημοσθένους κατὰ 
« μὲν» τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων τῇ δεινότητι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν 
τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τῇ ἐξαλλαγῇ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εὕρεσιν 
τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τῷ μὴ καινὰ καὶ παράδοξα λαμβάνειν ἀλλὰ 


A hie “ “ , 
pavepa Kal EV τῷ MEOW KELMEVA. 


oi περὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Θρασύμαχον καὶ ᾿Αντιφῶντα σπουδῆς ἄξιον οὐδὲν εὗρον οὔτε 
᾿Ισοκράτης καὶ ᾿Αναξιμένης καὶ ᾿Αλκιδάμας οὔτε οἱ τούτοις συμβιώσαντες τοῖς 
ἀνδράσι παραγγελμάτων τεχνικῶν συγγραφεῖς καὶ ἀγωνισταὶ λόγων ῥητορικῶν, 
οἱ wept Θεοδέκτην καὶ Φιλίσκον καὶ ᾿Ισαῖον καὶ Κηφισόδωρον Ὑπερείδην τε καὶ 
Λυκοῦργον καὶ Αἰσχίνην, οὐδ᾽ « ἂν» αὐτὸς ὁ Δημοσθένης ὁ πάντας ὑπερβαλόμενος 
τούς τε πρὸ αὑτοῦ καὶ τοὺς Kab’ ἑαυτὸν καὶ μηδὲ τοῖς γινομένοις ὑπερβολὴν καταλιπὼν 
τοσοῦτος éyévero τοῖς ᾿Ισοκράτους τε καὶ ᾿Ισαίου κοσμούμενος παραγγέλμασιν, 
εἰ μὴ τὰς ᾿Αριστοτέλους τέχνας ἐξέμαθεν. 

Ad Amm., 12 (749): ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὐχ ὁ ῥήτωρ παρὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου 
τὰς τέχνας παρέλαβεν αἷς τοὺς θαυμαστοὺς ἐκείνους κατεσκεύασε λόγους, ἀλλὰ 
τοὐναντίον τὰ Δημοσθένους καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων ἔργα παραθέμενος ᾿Αριστοτέλης 
ταύτας ἔγραψε τὰς τέχνας, ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι νομίζω. For the thought cf. 
Philost. Vit. Soph., 213, IV: Δημοσθένης γὰρ μαθητὴς μὲν ᾿Ισαίου, ζηλωτὴς 
δὲ ᾿Ισοκράτους γενόμενος ὑπερεβάλετο αὐτὸν θυμῷ κτλ. 

1 De Dem., 58 (1129): ἐὰν δὲ σώζῃ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἡμᾶς, καὶ περὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς 
αὐτοῦ δεινότητος, ἔτι μείζονος ἢ τοῦδε καὶ θαυμαστοτέρου θεωρήματος, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς 
γὙραφησομένοις ἀποδώσομέν σοι τὸν λόγον. 

De Thuc., I (812): σοῦ δὲ βουληθέντος ἰδίαν συντάξασθαί με περὶ Θουκυδίδου 
γραφὴν ἅπαντα περιειληφυῖαν τὰ δεόμενα λόγων, ἀναβαλόμενος τὴν περὶ Δημο- 
σθένους πραγματείαν, ἣν εἶχον ἐν χερσίν, ὑπεσχόμην τε ποιήσειν, ὡς προῃροῦ, καὶ 
τελέσας τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδίδωμι. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 53 


SUMMARY 


We have found that Dionysius adopts as his own the 
principles of the ‘‘ philosophy ”’ held by Isocrates with the 
corollary that the ‘ philosophic rhetorician’’ is statesman 
and philosopher; and have followed the application of Isoc- 
rates’ rules about the choice of subject to the work of literary 
criticism. 


ARISTIDES AND -PSEUDO-LUCIAN 


I HAVE traced in the preceding chapters the revival of the 
sophistical ideal in Cicero and Dionysius. As von Arnim has 
pointed out,! this movement did not meet with immediate 
success. The century following Dionysius seems to have pro- 
duced no one who inclined to Isocratean principles. But the 
second century of our era witnessed a renewed interest in the 
rhetorical theories which we have found in Cicero and 
Dionysius. It is my purpose in this chapter to discuss some 
' phases of this later revival. 

The second-century sophist, Aristides, devotes four speeches 
to the praise of rhetoric,—two Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, 
and Πρὸς Καπιτῶνα. The two Περὶ ῥητορικῆς are answers to 
Plato’s attack on rhetoric in the Gorgias; the speech Ὑπὲρ 
τῶν τεττάρων is a defense of the political careers of Pericles, 
Miltiades, Cimon and Themistocles; the fourth speech, Πρὸς 
Καπιτῶνα, answers some objections that had been raised to 
arguments that he had used in the other speeches. While 
all four speeches are directed against Plato’s criticisms of 
rhetoric, this reply to Plato is merely a convenient starting 
point for an encomium of rhetoric, in which he claims for the 
orator the possession of all virtues. It is plain, too, that under 
the name of Plato, he is attacking the philosophers of his 
own day.2. This can be seen in the spiteful attack on phi- 
losophers with which he closes the speech Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων 
(II, 399 ff.),2 and in such phrases as these: 


1 Dio von Prusa, p. 112: Ich schreibe der Erneuerung des sophistischen 
Bildungsideals durch Philon die grésste geschichtliche Bedeutung zu, 
obgleich sie zunachst fast spurlos voriiber zu gehen scheint. Der Gedanke, 
die Philosophenschulen auf das praktische Ziel der rednerischen Ausbildung 
zuzuspitzen, hat keinen Anklang gefunden. 

2See Baumgart, Aelius Aristides als Reprasentant der Sophistischen 
Rhetorik des zweiten Jahrhunderts der Kaiserzeit, p. 21. 

8 The references are to the edition of Dindorf. 

54 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 55 


. II, p. 84: τῶν Πλάτωνος ἑταίρων ἀποκρινάσθω τις, ἐπειδήπερ 
αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔχομεν παραστήσασθαι. 

IT, p. 149: εἰπὲ δή μοι πρὸς θεῶν, εἴτε Πλάτων εἴτε ἄλλος τις 
ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου βούλεται. . .. 

The battle between the philosophers and the rhetoricians 
was still going on, and Aristides in spite of all his attempts to 
prove that Plato supports the sophistical ideal, merely calls 
attention to the irreconcilable differences between the philos- 
ophers and the rhetoricians. 

Much of this chapter has been anticipated by Baumgart in 
the second chapter of his very useful book on Aristides. But 
I hope to show by a more detailed presentation of some of 
Aristides’ theories of rhetoric, and by a comparison of them 
with those of his predecessors, that in all essential particulars 
he belongs to the same school as Isocrates, Cicero and Di- 
onysius. The verbal correspondences with Isocrates are not 
so close as in Cicero and Dionysius, but this is due rather to 
Aristides’ verbosity than to any difference of thought. 

One of the striking passages in Isocrates is his account of 
the growth of civilization through the power of λόγος (Nic., 
5-8 = Ant., 253-256). This was utilized by Cicero, and 
appears in Aristides. The latter casts the story in the form 
of amyth. ‘‘ Newly created man was inferior to the animals 
and was in danger of being utterly destroyed. Prometheus 
pleaded with Zeus to save the human race. At his suggestion 
Zeus sent Hermes to bestow on mankind the blessing of 
rhetoric. Under its influence men ceased quarrelling with 
one another, formed communities, built cities, and made 
laws.’’! In another passage (II, pp. 63-75) Aristides enlarges 
on the services rendered by rhetoric in establishing laws and 
maintaining justice among men. 

The resemblances to Isocrates are plain. For the sake of 
illustration I shall quote the principal steps in the growth of 
civilization as pictured by Isocrates and the parallels in 
Aristides. 


111, pp. 134 ff. 


56 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


Isoc. Nic., 5 (= Ant., 253): rots yap ἄλλοις ols ἔχομεν οὐδὲν τῶν 
ζώων διαφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ τῷ τάχει Kal τῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ 
ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδεέστεροι τυγχάνομεν ὄντες. 

Cf. Arist., II, p. 134: πᾶσι γὰρ πάντων ἀπελείποντο ἄλλοτε 
ἄλλων, τάχει μὲν τῶν πτηνῶν ἁπάντων... κατ᾽ ἰσχὺν δ᾽ αὖ 
πόρρω τῶν λεόντων. .. καὶ μὴν τῇ γε κατασκευῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐ 
μόνον τῶν προβάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κοχλιῶν ἀπελείποντο. 

The blessings of civilized society followed the introduction 
of rhetoric. 

Isoc. Nic., 6 (= Ant., 254): ἐγγενομένου δ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῦ πείθειν 
ἀλλήλους... OV μόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ 

A ll ld ϑ Ud A li ϑ t \ L e 
Kal συνελθόντες πόλεις φκίσαμεν Kal νόμους ἐθέμεθα Kal τέχνας εὕρομεν. 

Arist., II, p. 135: ἀφικομένης δὲ ῥητορικῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους. 

9 A = w A \ “Ὁ ’ ἡ Ἧ 
ἠδυνήθησαν μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων δίαιταν χαλεπὴν 
ἐκφυγεῖν, . . .. κοινωνίας δ᾽ εὗρον ἀρχήν. καταβάντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν 
ὀρῶν. .. πόλιν τε κατεσκευάσαντο. .. καὶ τοὺς πόλεων ἡγεμόνας 
νόμους ἔθεντο καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ πολιτείαν ἐνόμισαν. 

The other passage in Aristides (II, pp. 63-75) is simply an 
expansion of the words of Isocrates—vomous ἐθέμεθα... τούτῳ 
(1. €., λόγῳ) τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν. In a lengthy argument 
Aristides shows that rhetoric was invented to insure justice 
and equity, that through rhetoric alone life is made possible,! 
that the establishment of laws and the maintenance of courts 
of justice presupposes the existence of rhetoric.2 Of the 
three, νόμοι, δίκη, λόγοι, the chief place must be accorded to 

1TI, p. 64: εὑρέθη τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ῥητορικὴ Kal παρῆλθε φυλακτήριον δικαιο- 
σύνης καὶ σύνδεσμος τοῦ βίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . .. εὑρεθεῖσα δὲ ὑπὲρ τοιούτων καὶ 
τηλικούτων μόνη βιωτὸν ἡμῖν πεποίηκε τὸν βίον. 

211, pp. 64-71, especially p. 65: φαίνεται. .. μέρος οὖσα τῆς ῥητορικῆς 
ἡ νομοθετικὴ καὶ τοῖς πᾶσι δευτέρα πως, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔδει τῶν 
νόμων λόγου τοῦ πείθοντος. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν εὔδν λον ὅτι οἱ νόμοι μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάντας 
τὸ προσῆκον ἔχειν ἔμελλον τεθήσεσθαι, τοῦτο δ᾽ οἱ τῃ χειρὶ κρείττους οὐκ ἔμελλον 
συμβουλήσεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔδει λόγου τοῦ πείσοντος ἤδη; Ὁ. 67: πόθεν 
εὑρήσει τὸ δίκαιον ἢ παρὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγχει τὰ γιγνόμενα (cf. 
Isoc. Nic., 7: τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν). Ὀ. 68: . .. ἥ τεδικαστικὴ σχῆμα 


ἐπικούρου λαβοῦσα τοῖς νόμοις αὐτὴ πρότερον προσεδεήθη τῆς παρὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς 
βοηθείας. ἔδει γὰρ αὐτὴν δυνηθῆναι βοηθῆσαι: τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ ῥητορικῆς. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 57 


λόγοι. In this view that all development of society and 
civilization is the result of rhetoric Aristides has adopted and 
expanded the doctrine of Isocrates and Cicero. 

This account of the development of civilization and govern- 
ment under the guidance of the orator forms the historical 
background for the theories of rhetoric as a training for 
practical life. This was the main thesis of Isocrates’ system, 
that the orator is the best statesman, the best philosopher, 
the best manager of his own affairs. This point is insisted 
on by Aristides and developed by him at great length and 
with abundance of historical examples. The principal passage 
is the speech Ὑπὲρ τῶν rerradpwv—a defense of Miltiades, 
Cimon, Themistocles and Pericles. I have shown above 
(p. 42 ff.) that a writer’s attitude toward these statesmen is 
a test of his attitude toward the sophistical rhetoric. So 
that when Aristides undertakes to prove against the argu- 
ments of Plato that these statesmen were true ῥήτορες and 
leaders of the people, he is taking his position beside Isocrates 
and Cicero. A complete statement of all the arguments by 
which he answers, or thinks that he answers, the criticisms of 
Plato would extend far beyond the limits of the dissertation, 
but I will give enough quotations to show his general attitude. 

Of Pericles he says: 

II, p. 175: λαλιᾶς μὲν οἶμαι διὰ κενῆς ληρεῖν Kal els μηδὲν δέον 
καὶ διατρίβειν τηνάλλως, λόγων δὲ ἀληθινῶν τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τῶν 
πραγμάτων στοχάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ πρέπον σώζειν πανταχοῦ. τούτοις 
γοῦν ἕπεται καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν οἶμαι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς προσάγεσθαι τῶν 
ἀκουόντων. ὁ τοίνυν Περικλῆς τοσοῦτον νικῶν καὶ τοσαῦτα ἀφ᾽ ὧν 
ἐνίκα πράττων λάλος μὲν ἥκιστα, οἶμαι, λέγειν δὲ ἄριστος εἰκότως 
ἐνομίζετο. . .. εἰ δὲ det καὶ σεμνοτέρου μάρτυρος, σκόπει τί φησιν ὁ 
Θουκυδίδης ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγοις. εὑρήσεις γὰρ ἁπανταχοῦ 
μεμνημένον ὡς ἀρίστου λέγειν καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἀμφισβήτησιν δόντα ὅτι μὴ 

1110, p. 71: ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι μιᾶς ὡσπερεὶ μοίρας καὶ φύσεως οἱ νόμοι, ἡ δίκη, οἱ 
λόγοι. τριῶν δ᾽ οὐσῶν τούτων δυνάμεων, ὅπερ λέγων ἐξέβην, ἁπάσας τὰς χώρας 


- 


ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη καταλαμβάνει. 


58 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


καὶ πράττειν οὗτός ye πρὸς τῷ λέγειν προστίθησιν, ἐπειδὰν πρῶτον 
αὐτὸν εἶναι φῇ. 

In this passage the following points demand especial notice: 
λαλιᾶς is contrasted with λόγων ἀληθινῶν as an answer to the 
charge that Pericles made the Athenians λάλους.: The use of 
στοχάζεσθαι is at the same time a reply to the disparaging 
statement that rhetoric is mere guesswork,” and an acceptance 
of Isocrates’ idea that ἐπιστήμη is impossible, and that true 
σοφία consists in 6d¢a.2 This is, of course, one of the funda- 
mental differences between Plato and Isocrates, and is there- 
fore a valuable indication of the standpoint of Aristides. 
Another Isocratean point is the connection of πράττειν and 
λέγειν (cf. p. 3). Still another resemblance is the use of 
καιρός,---ΟΠ of Isocrates’ catch-words (cf. p. 3). 

The connection between statesmanship and rhetoric is 
brought out even more clearly on p. 202: ἀλλ᾽ ὁρῶντες ἄνδρα 
καὶ λέγειν Kal wpattev* ἄκρον καὶ δουλείας μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἐγγύς, 
ἄρχειν δ᾽ ἐπιτηδειότατον καὶ ἱκανώτατον καὶ πάντων ὑπερφυκότα τῶν 
ἄλλων, ἔπαθόν τι ὋὉμηρικὸν καὶ παραπλήσιον αὐτὸν τοῖς θεοῖς 
ἐνόμισαν." 

1 ῬΙαίο, Gorgias, 515ῈΕ: ταυτὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι 
᾿Αθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους. . .. 

2 Plato, Gorgias, 463 A: δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Τοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα 
τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. 

8 Isoc. Ant., 271: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν Ty φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμην 
λαβεῖν, ἣν ἔχοντες ἂν εἰδεῖμεν ὅτι πρακτέον ἢ λεκτέον ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν σοφοὺς 
μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους 
κτλ. 

Panath., 20: Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους . . . ; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς 
χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν 
δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ 
συμφέροντος. 

‘The combination of πράττειν and λέγειν is thoroughly Isocratean; 
οἷ. Ῥ. 4, ἢ. 1. 


5 Cf. Εἰς. De Orat., III, 14, 53: quem deum, ut ita dicam, inter homines 


putant? 
ἔπαθόν τι ‘Ounprxdr alludes to such passages as Od., VII, γι: 


οἵ uly pa θεὸν ds εἰσορόωντες 
δειδέχαται μύθοισιν, ὅτε στείχῃσ᾽ ἀνὰ ἄστυ. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 59 


Of Miltiades we have the following characteristic passages: 

II, p. 231: οὐκοῦν πάνθ᾽ Gua μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, 
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄτεχνον τριβὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν Μιλτιάδην καὶ τοῦ λέγειν 
τεχνίτην καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς λόγοις παραπλήσιον. 

II, p. 232: διὸ δὴ καὶ προὐκρίθη (Μιλτιάδης) μόνος ἐξ ἁπάντων, ὥς 
φασι, τὴν χεῖρα ἐκτετακὼς γραφῆναι, ὡς τότε ἔτυχε τοῖς στρατιώταις 
παρακελευόμενος. οὕτως ἐκεῖνός γε οὐ μόνον ἐν πνυκὲ [τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ], 
ἀλλὰ καὶ Μαραθῶνι ῥήτωρ χρηστὸς ἦν καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀγαθὸν 
παρείχετο σῶν πανταχοῦ. ‘This last sentence carries a double 
meaning. At first sight it seems to say no more than that 
Miltiades made a good speech before the battle. But there is 
suggested the thought that the orator is the best general—a 
principle which Aristides elsewhere enunciates with great 
clearness, 6. g.: 

II, p. 140: μετὰ τοίνυν τῆς στρατηγικῆς γενομένη πολλῷ μᾶλλον 
σώζειν αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς πέφυκεν. 

II, p. 141: θεὶς τὴν ῥητορικὴν τῆς στρατηγικῆς τοσούτῳ κυριωτέραν, 
ὅσῳ δέκα ἄνδρες. δέκα μυριάδων ἐλάττους ἀριθμῷ: εἰκότως. οὐ γὰρ 
πόρρωθεν εἰλήφει τὸν ἔλεγχον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τότε ὡρμημένους ᾿Αχαιοὺς 
ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ὑφαιροῦντας ἤδη τὰ ἕρματα τῶν νεῶν καὶ τὴν θάλατταν 
ὑπερβοῶντας μὴ κατέσχον οἱ δύο οὗτοι ῥήτορες, τί πλέον τῶν τακτικῶν 
ἦν . ..; ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅπερ οἱ σκευοφόροι τοῖς ὁπλίταις εἰσί, 
τοῦτ᾽ ἐφάνη τότε πᾶσα οὖσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν 
ἅπασι τούτοις ῥητορικήν (cf. II, p. 52, quoted below, p. 60). 

Aristides also praises Solon, who was adduced by Isocrates 
as an example of the orator-statesman.! Plato had classed 
Solon with the poets.? But Aristides shows from Plato’s own 
statements that poetry stripped of metre and rhythm becomes 
dnunyopia, so that if Solon had never spoken from the βῆμα, 
we should still have to class him with the political leaders. 
He then continues (II, p. 361): οὐκ ἄδων οὐδ᾽ ἐν μέτροις ἔπολι- 
τεύετο, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῆς ῥητορικῆς τύπῳ καθαρῶς χρώμενος, ἐν ols ἅπασι 

Parallel passages are collected in a note on Od., XV, 520, in Ameis- 
Hentze, Anhang zu Homers Odyssee. 


1 Ant., 235, 313. 
2 Phaedrus, 2780; Tim., 21B. 


60 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


κάλλιστα ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι TH γε ὀρθοτάτῳ τῶν λόγων αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη 
ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφός, ἀμφοτέρας γοῦν ἔσχε τὰς ἐπωνυμίας τε καὶ 
δυνάμεις, καὶ ὅτι γε ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ ἡ νομοθετικὴ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι 
φύσεως (cf. p. 206). 

These five statesmen form the basis for Aristides’ claim that 
oratory and statesmanship are inseparably united. These are 
the same examples used by Isocrates (who adds to the list 
Clisthenes), and the claims made for them are the same in 
both writers—that the statesmen were orators, and that 
through their oratory came their power as statesmen. 

Before leaving this part of the subject, I shall give a few 
passages from the two treatises Hep! ῥητορικῆς in which an 
abstract statement is made of this principle. 

II, p. 52: (Replying to Plato’s charge that rhetoric is 
στοχαστικός) TL δὲ περὶ ῥητορικῆς εἰ στοχάζεται θαυμάζεις; φαίνεται 
γὰρ ὁμοίως διακειμένη τῇ μαντικῇ, πλὴν ὅσον μαντικὴ μὲν ἀπήλλακται 
στοχασαμένη, ῥητορικὴ δὲ οὐ στοχάζεται μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττει διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ἅττ᾽ ἂν εὑρίσκῃ βέλτιστα. 
ὥστε καὶ τὸν τῆς μαντικῆς ἐπέχει λόγον καὶ τὸν τῆς στρατηγι- 
κῆς,1 ἣν μηδὲν τῇ πολιτικῇ προσήκειν Πλάτων οὐκ ἐρεῖ. 

II, p. 58: ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν φαίης ἁρμόττει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀκοῦσαι τῷ 
ῥήτορι, ἄρχων, προστάτης, διδάσκαλος, πάντα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ 
τοῦ ῥήτορος τὰ ὀνόματα. 

II, p. 59: πάντες μὲν οὖν ἄρχοντες φύσει κρείττους τῶν ὑφ᾽ 
αὑτοῖς" εἰ δὲ τις per’ ἐξουσίας καὶ χαρίζεται, πείθων οὐκ ἀναγκάζων, 
καὶ πρὸς τῷ σώζειν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν στοχάζεται" καὶ τῆς ἐπι- 
θυμίας τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὑτῷ, οὗτος ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ τῷ ὄντι πολιτικὸς καὶ ὃν 
“Ὅμηρος ἔφη πατέρα ὡς ἤπιον εἶναι. οἶμαι δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ 
ῥήτορα ἄριστον πεποίηκεν, ᾧ τοῦτο ἀνέθηκε. 

II, p. 98: εἰ γὰρ δεῖ συνελόντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ῥητορικὴ 
ἢ φρὀνησις λόγων δύναμιν προσειληφυῖα," ὡς μὴ μόνον 
αὐτὸς ἔρδειν τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθειν ἔχοι. 

1Cf. the references quoted above (p. 77 f.) in connection with Milti- 
ades. 

2 Cf. the use of στοχάζεσθαι in II, 175, and the defense of στοχάζεσθαι, 


II, 42 f., 53, 54. 
8 Cf. Isocrates’ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν. (For passages v. p. 3.) 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 61 


II, p. 121: καὶ τοσούτῳ γέ τι τῶν κυβερνητῶν οἱ ῥήτορες κυρι- 
ὠτεροι ἢ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐκεῖνοι, ὅσον οἱ μὲν πλεόντων εἰσὶ κύριοι τῶν 
ναυτῶν, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλεῖν ἢ μὴ τοὺς κυβερνήτας: μᾶλλον δὲ 
ἀμφοτέρων εἰσὶ κύριοι, καὶ τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐμπλεόντων, οἱ 
ῥήτορες. διδάσκουσί γε καὶ πείθουσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πότε καὶ ποῖ πλευστέον. 

II, p. 122: ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ οὐ σώζειν οἷδε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκτιν- 


7 \ 


νύειν Kal ἐκβάλλειν ods ἄμεινον" ὥστε τέλειον EE ἀμφοτέρων TO κράτος 
τῷ ῥήτορι. καὶ ὁ μέν γε κυβερνήτης οὐδὲ ods σὠζει πρὸς ἀξίαν 
σώζει. .. ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώζειν μερίδα σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ 
πληροῖ. 

II, p. 129: οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰδέναι 
πότε χρὴ σιωπᾶν. καὶ μὴν ὅστις γε ἃ προσήκει λέγειν οἶδεν, οἶδεν ἃ 
πράττειν TPOTHKEL. 

II, p. 120: ὅσῳ γὰρ βέλτιον ἄρχειν ἢ διακονεῖν, τοσούτῳ λέγειν 
τὰ δέοντα βέλτιον ἢ πράττειν. 

II, p. 133: ἔστιν ἄρα ῥητορικῆς ἔργον καὶ φρονεῖν ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ 
μόνον αὑτὸν ἃ det πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθοντα ἃ δεῖ πράτ- 


τειν παρέχεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως εἶναι βασιλικόν. 


The conflict between rhetoric and philosophy is nowhere 
plainer than in Aristides. All the speeches in defense of 
rhetoric are, either openly or covertly, attacks on the philo- 
sophical schools. Plato bears the brunt of the attack, but 
the bitterest passages are directed against the false philos- 
ophers,—those ‘‘ who should rather be called giAocwparor.’”? 
The principal points in his arguments have been summed up 
by Baumgart (pp. 24-35). But one or two points may well 
be amplified for the sake of showing more clearly the influence 
of the Isocratean tradition on Aristides. 

It is important to notice that Aristides is not merely trying 
to drive the philosophers from the province that rightfully 
belongs to rhetoric. Any compromise by which rhetoric and 
philosophy should exist on equal terms is unthinkable. For 


111, p. 408. The passage from p. 399 to p. 414 is devoted to the attack 
on philosophy. 


62 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


to Aristides, as a true representative of Isocrates, rhetoric 
takes the place of philosophy.! No polite phrases of compli- 
ment? can obscure the fact that Aristides believes that what- 
ever philosophy does, rhetoric can do better.* In the speech 
Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς he takes up Plato’s criticisms of rhetoric, and 
shows that the supposed faults are really virtues, or that the 
same charges can be made with greater justice against phi- 
losophy. Several of the passages presenting the orator as 
philosopher have necessarily been included in the discussion 
of the orator as statesman.* I shall add some passages to 
illustrate the connection between rhetoric and thought, and 
between rhetoric and ethics. 

In demonstrating the identity of the thinker and the 
speaker he quotes Hesiod (’Epy., 293, 295): 


1 He discusses the original meaning of σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, II, pp. 
407 ff. σοφιστής = σοφός. In this sense it was applied by Herodotus to 
Solon and Pythagoras, by Androtion to the Seven Sages and to Socrates. 
Isocrates applied the term σοφισταί to the teachers of eristic and dialectic, 
and called himself a giAédcogos—guirdc0gov δ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ 
τοὺς περὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἕξιν φιλοσόφους. (Haas, Quibus fontibus Aelius Ari- 
stides in componenda declamatione, quae inscribitur Πρὸς Πλάτωνα. 
usus sit, p. 54, supposes that this is a quotation from the lost part of the 
Kara τῶν σοφιστῶν) As his own definition Aristides gives (407): ἀλλ᾽ 
οἶμαι καὶ σοφιστὴς ἐπιεικῶς κοινὸν ἦν ὄνομα Kal ἡ φιλοσοφία τοῦτ᾽ ἠδύνατο, φιλο- 
καλία τις εἶναι καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους (cf. Ant., 186 ff.), καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν 
τρόπος οὗτος (t.'e., the narrow view held at present), ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς. 
Plato, he continues, used φιλόσοφος in this broad sense and in the narrower 
meaning—rtobs περὶ τὰς ἰδέας πραγματευομένους Kal τῶν σωμάτων ὑπερορῶντας--- 
a definition which he would apply only to the followers of Plato and 
Pythagoras; the other sects are φιλοσώματοι. 

2 FE. g., 11, p. 410: καὶ ταῦτα μηδεὶς οἰέσθω βλασφημίαν eis φιλοσοφίαν ἔχειν 
pnd’ ἀηδίᾳ μηδεμιᾷ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας εἶναι καὶ 
πρὸς τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ταύτην εἰρῆσθαι. 

II, p. 413: οἶμαι δὲ κἀγὼ συγγενέσθαι τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ φιλοσοφησάντων τοῖς 
ἀρίστοις καὶ τελεωτάτοιςν, καὶ οὐ πολλῶν ἡττᾶσθαι ταύτῃ θνητῶν, καὶ ἐν τροφέων 
μοίρᾳ γεγόνασί μοι. ὥστε τοῖς οἴκοι πολεμοίην ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. 

Cf. II, p. 82: If philosophy prevents ἀδικεῖν, and rhetoric ἀδικεῖσθαι, 
rhetoric by removing ἀδικεῖσθαι has also prevented ἀδικεῖν, etc. 

4711, p. 361: ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφός. 

II, p. 129: οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰδέναι πότε χρὴ 
σιωπᾶν. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 63 


a A ld a « lal U 
Κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὑτῷ πάντα νοήσῃ: 


; A ᾽ s ’ a) a > } Say A , é 
ἐσθλὸς 6 αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται 


and gives this commentary (II, p. 32): οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς πάντα 
νοήσας ἐστὶν ὁ εὖ εἰπών εἰ δὲ βούλει ἐκείνως, ὁ μὲν εὖ εἰπών ἐστιν ὁ 
νοήσας αὐτὸς ἅπαντα... μετείληφεν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ εὖ 
εἰπόντος τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λέγων, ἀντὶ τοῦ νοήσαντος τὸν εὖ εἰπόντα 
θείς, ὡς αὐτὸν τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν βέλτιστον ῥήτορα. 

The identification of the original thinker with the orator is 
even stronger in II, p. 98: .. . οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ῥητορικὴ ἢ 
φρόνησις λόγων δύναμιν προσειληφυῖα, ws μὴ μόνον αὐτὸς ἔρδειν 
τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθειν ἔχοι. II, p. 133: ἔστιν ἄρα 
ῥητορικῆς ἔργον καὶ φρονεῖν ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ μόνον αὑτὸν ἃ δεῖ 
πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρους πείθοντα ἃ det πράττειν παρέχεσθαι. 

In reply to Plato’s comparison of rhetoric to the art of the 
pilot he says that the pilot merely saves men, good and bad 
alike, but the ῥήτωρ knows whom to save and whom to kill. 
II, p. 122: 6 δὲ ῥήτωρ ob σώζειν οἷδε μόνον, ἀλλὰ Kal ἀποκτιννύειν 
καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ods ἄμεινον" ὥστε τέλειον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ κράτος τῷ 
ῥήτορι. 

In II, p. 129, we have a direct comparison between the 
knowledge of the philosopher and the knowledge of the ῥήτωρ. 
Kal μὴν & γε εἰδὼς τί det λέγειν οἷδε Ti Set σιωπῆσαι Kal πότ᾽ ἄμεινον 
εἰπεῖν καὶ πότ᾽ ἐᾶσαι: .. . οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ φιλοσόφου μᾶλλον 
ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος εἰδέναι πότε χρὴ σιωπᾶν. κτλ. 

I have shown that Isocrates, Cicero and Dionysius made 
the orator supreme in the sphere of ethics which is more 
strictly the province of the philosopher. The same view 
appears in Aristides. First the ῥήτωρ is a good man himself, 
made so by the necessity of his profession. 

II, p. 83: ἀλλὰ μὴν 6 γε ἑτέρους Ta δίκαια πράττειν ἐπαναγκάζων 
πολὺ που πρῶτον αὐτός γε παρεσκεύασται. οὐ γὰρ &yxwpet βοηθεῖν 

1Cf. Isoc. Ant., 277: . .. ὥσθ᾽ ἅμα τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν παραγενήσεται 
τοῖς φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους διακειμένοις. 


The phrase εὖ εἰπών naturally assumes in a rhetorician a meaning quite 
different from that which it had in Hesiod. 


64 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ, τοῦ δὲ καταλύειν τὸ δίκαιον αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν. 
οὐκοῦν ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀδικήσει, GAN’ οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον ἐάσει" 
.. . 84: ὁ μὲν γὰρ καλός τε κἀγαθὸς οὐ πάντη ῥήτωρ, ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ 
καλὸς κἀγαθός, ὅς γε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἄγει. 

The virtue of the ῥήτωρ is of course only a preliminary to 
his great task of producing virtue among mankind.? The four 
parts of virtue are all connected with rhetoric: II, p. 72: ἀλλὰ 
μὴν τῆς ye ἀρετῆς τέτταρα δή πού φασιν εἶναι μόρια, φρόνησιν, 
σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν. ῥητορικὴ τοίνυν εὑρέθη μὲν ἐν 
φρονήσει καὶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, σωφροσύνη δὲ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ 
ἀνδρείᾳ τὰς πόλεις σὠζει" . .. τεττάρων ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς 
ἅπαντα 6’ αὐτῆς πεποίηται. The same thought is repeated 
almost verbatim on page 128. 

As an example of this we have the character of the Athenians 
under the rule of Pericles, II, p. 179: καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐτίμων κἀκεῖνον 
καὶ τοὺς λόγους, τοσούτῳ κοσμιώτερον Kal σωφρονέστερον αὑτῶν 
ἕξεσθαι καὶ πάσης παρανομίας ἀφέξεσθαι. 

This presentation of Aristides’ views on rhetoric will, I 
hope, serve to show that while he has few actual quotations 
from Isocrates, his point of view is essentially Isocratean in 
that he glorifies the orator as the true statesman, general and 


philosopher. 


THE PsEUDO-LUCIANIC LAUDATIO DEMOSTHENIS 


In the Encomium of Demosthenes that has come down to 
us in the Lucianic corpus we have a good example of the 
ascription of all virtues to the orator. Demosthenes was not 
only a model of virtue in private life, and a wonderful speaker, 
but was especially remarkable for σύνεσις and φρόνημα as a 
statesman, and had all the qualities essential for a general,— 
had he only taken the field Philip would have been forced to 
fight for the possession of Macedonia. 

I give below several passages to illustrate the author’s 


1 Cf. Isoc. Ant., 278: καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁ πείθειν βουλόμενος ἀμελήσει τῆς ἀρετῆς κτλ. 
ἘΣ ΟΙ ΠΡ ΤΗ: 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 65 


attitude. A general review of all his qualities—18: σὺ δ᾽ εἰ 
μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην ὅλον ἐράπαξ τῇ γνώμῃ τράποιο, Kal μάλα ἂν 
ἀποροῖς περὶ τὸν λόγον ἄττων οὐδ᾽ ἔχων ὅτου πρώτου τῇ γνώμῃ 
λάβοιο. .. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σὲ μεταπηδᾶν οὐκ ἔχοντα ἐφ᾽ ὅτι σταίης, 
ἐν κύκλῳ σε περιελκόντων φύσεως μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ὁρμῆς διαπύρου, 
βίου σώφρονος, λόγου δεινότητος, τῆς ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀνδρείας, 
λημμάτων πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὑπεροψίας, δικαιοσύνης φιλανθρωπίας 
πίστεως φρονήματος συνέσεως, ἑκάστου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων 
πολιτευμάτων. 

Farther on in the treatise emphasis is laid on the fact that 
Demosthenes was more remarkable as a statesman than as an 
orator. 

32: ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δή τινα πάντων καὶ Δημοσθένην αὐτός τε δὶς ᾿Αθήνησιν, 
εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ πολλὴν σχολήν, συγγενόμενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἀναπυνθανόμενος ἔκ τε τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτῶν εἶχον θαυμάσας, 
οὐχ ὡς ἂν νομίσειέ τις, τῆς τῶν λόγων δεινότητος .. . . . 33: ἐγὼ 
δὲ ταύτην (τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ λόγου) μὲν δευτέραν ἔταττον ἐν χώρᾳ 
τιθεὶς ὀργάνου, Δημοσθένην δὲ αὐτὸν ὑπερηγάμην τοῦ τε φρονή - 
ματος καὶ τῆς συνέσεως. 

πειθὼ and γνώμη are coupled in chapter 34: 

τῆς ὅπλων Bias THY τοῦ λόγου πειθὼ Kal TO τῆς γνώμης ἐμβριθὲς 
οὐδαμῆ τιθεὶς δεύτερον. 

He is the equal of Themistocles and Pericles. 37: ὃ γὰρ 
᾿Αθηναίοις Tots πάλαι Θεμιστοκλῆς Kal Περικλῆς ἐγένετο, τοῦτο Tots 
νῦν ὁ Δημοσθένης, ἐφάμιλλος Θεμιστοκλεῖ μὲν τὴνν σύνεσιν, 
Περικλεῖ δὲ τὸ ρρόνημα. 

He would have made a successful general. 37: (Philip 
speaks) καὶ καλῶς ye, ἔφη, ποιοῦσιν ᾿Αθηναῖοι Χάρητα μὲν καὶ 
Διοπείθην καὶ ἸΠΙρόξενον καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς ἀποδεικνύντες στρατηγεῖν, 
Δημοσθένην δὲ εἴσω κατέχοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. ὡς εἰ τοῦτον τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον ὅπλων ἀπέφηναν καὶ νεῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων καὶ καιρῶν καὶ 
χρημάτων κύριον, ὀκνῶ μὴ περὶ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἂν κατέστησέ μοι τὸν 
λόγον. 

Chapter 38 continues in a similar strain. His adherence 


1 Cf. Cicero’s veteres illi. 
6 


66 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


to the Isocratean ideal is well summed up in the phrase (41): 
αὑτῷ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν γυμνάσιον φιλοσοφίας προθέμενος. 

He is orator, philosopher, statesman and general, and his 
philosophy is that of Isocrates, the philosophy that is practical. 


CONCLUSION 


With the discussion of the influence of Isocrates on Cicero, 
Dionysius, Aristides and the author of the Laudatio Demos- 
thenis this dissertation comes to an end. To follow all the 
ramifications of the subject would involve making several 
independent studies. The introduction of Aristides natu- 
rally suggests the question of the Second Sophistic and its 
antecedents.! Then, again, it has not been possible to consider 
the problem of the fragments of Philodemus, and the possible 
relation between them and the lost treatise of Dionysius Ὑπὲρ 


“ Xr a x ’ \ \ ᾿ 8 Υὁ ἂν ἀδί 2 I 
TNS πολιτικῆς PLAOTO PLAS πρὸς TOUS κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς GOLKWS. n 


1Cf. Rohde, Der griechische Roman’, p. 312n. He considers the 
Second Sophistic a continuation of Asianism. This position is attacked 
by Kaibel in Hermes, XX (1885), 497, who regards Aristides as a successor 
of Dionysius and Isocrates, and minimizes the Asiatic influence. He is 
answered by Rohde in Rh. Mus., XLI (1886), 170, who draws the dis- 
tinction between Aristides and the other Sophists of his time. Aristides, 
he says, is not typical. In fact he is opposed to the main currents of 
thought of the age. The apparent connection between the Second So- 
phistic and the old Attic orators which is suggested by Philostratus’ 
mention of Aeschines as the first representative of the Second Sophistic 
is explained by Schmid, Atticismus I 28 ff. cf. also Brandstaetter, 
Leipziger Studien, 15 (1894), 260 ff. Norden (Antike Kunstprosa, 353 f.) 
thinks that both Kaibel and Rohde are right in that the conflict between 
Atticism and Asianism continued during the period designated as Second 
Sophistic, and some writers (Aristides in particular) clung to the Attic 
revival while others maintained the tradition of Asianism. The view of 
Norden, 354, that Asianism is a development of the old sophistic would 
seem to include Isocrates as a possible source of Asianism, and to be at 
variance with my view that Isocrates was a model for the Atticists. The 
discrepancy is only apparent, however. Isocrates was not used by the 
Asianists as a model (Schmid, Atticismus, II, 3, n. 3). So that Isocrates 
was not a part of the tradition of the Asian school, and for that reason was 
well fitted to be an authority for the Atticists. 

2 Cf. Usener’s preface to his edition of Dionysius, p. xxxv. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 67 


this dissertation the aim has been to present studies in a few 
authors who reveal the influence of Isocrates, and to point to 
the possibility of similar discoveries in allied fields. 


APPENDIX 


On pages 6-9 I suggested that by ἰδέαι Isocrates meant the 
“thought elements ”’ or “ ideas ’’ which were used in literary 
composition, that he made it a part of his course of instruction 
to present to his pupils a series of these ἰδέαι, and that in the 
Πρὸς Νικοκλέα we have a collection of such “‘ ideas ’’ on govern- 
ment without the rhetorical embellishment with which Isoc- 
rates would ordinarily have presented them to his readers. 
To confirm that suggestion I now propose to compare some of 
the thoughts of the Πρὸς Νικοκλέα with the form in which these 
thoughts are developed in other treatises—an analysis which 
I hope may throw some light on Isocrates’ methods of com- 
position. 

In the examples to be presented below five methods of 
treating the ἰδέαι are used. (1) The ἰδέα is expanded by 
enumerating details, or by substituting for a name of a class 
the names of the objects forming the class. A very simple 
example will suffice to illustrate my meaning. The word θηρία 
in the sentence περὶ τὰ θηρία τέχνας εὑρήκαμεν, αἷς αὐτῶν τὰς 
ψυχὰς ἡμεροῦμεν (Ad Nic., 12) appears in the expanded form in 
one place as ἵπποι, κύνες, τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζώων (Ant., 211), in 
another as λέοντες, ἄρκτοι (Ant., 212). (2) A similar method is 
that by which a thought or ἰδέα expressed in abstract or semi- 
scientific terms is developed into the plainer and more cir- 
cumstantial language of every-day life. For example, Ad 
Nic., 31, τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν becomes 
in Nic., 37, φιλεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τὸν βίον 
διάγειν, ἐν οἷς ἂν τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς αὑτῶν ὁρῶσι διατρίβοντας. 
(3) The reverse of this process may be employed. Naturally 
examples of this are rare, as the normal arrangement is that 
the scholastic statement is abstract and the concrete form is 


68 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ON 


best adapted to public presentation. For an instance of 
this usage see ὦ and b’ below, p 69. (4) The thought is 
repeated, each time with a different example, and the changes 
made necessary by the change in example. Thus the thought 
that careful training (ἐπιμέλεια) is useful in everything else 
and therefore must be useful in improving character, is de- 
veloped in Ant., 209 ff., in a threefold fashion, comparing the 
effect of ἐπιμέλεια on the soul with its effect on (a) πάσας 
τὰς πράξεις καὶ Tas τέχνας, (Ὁ) σώματα, (c) ἵππους, κύνας. (5) Per- 
haps the commonest method of development is by contrast or 
balance of thought. Thus in Ad Nic., 17, he gives the quali- 
ties of good laws; they must be just, useful, consistent, etc. 
Then in Panath., 144, wishing to show that the old laws of 
Athens were good, he first tells what they were not, and then 
gives as the affirmative side the qualities enumerated in Ad 
Nic., 17. This balancing of thought, this continuous use of 
the formulas pe ... δέ, οὐ. . . ἀλλά is a mannerism with 
Isocrates, so much so that it appears at times even in the 
otherwise simple and straightforward style of the Πρὸς Νικοκλέα. 

These are the methods of expanding an idea which are the 
most obvious. A more careful examination of the orations 
with this in mind would doubtless reveal many more. A few 
examples may now be taken up to illustrate the way in which 
the various methods were combined. 

Ad Nic., 12, appears in an expanded form in Ant., 209 ff. In 
Ad Nic. we find two ideas: one that careful training will 
improve the mind; the other, if we can train animals we can 
train men. The way in which these ideas are developed in the 
Antidosis can best be shown by arranging the passages in 
parallel columns. 


Ad Nic., 12 Ant. 7200.4: 


(a) καὶ μὴ νόμιζε τὴν ἐπι- (α΄) πρῶτον μὲν εἰ πάσας τὰς 
μέλειαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας 
πράγμασι χρησίμην εἶναι, εἰδότες ταῖς μελέταις καὶ ταῖς 

f « £ 
φιλοπονίαις ἁλισκομένας, 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 


(ὁ) πρὸς δὲ τὸ βελτίους 
ἡμᾶς φρονιμωτέρους 
γίγνεσθαι μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν, 


καὶ 


(c) μηδὲ κατα γνῷς τῶν ἀν- 
θρώπων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν, 
ὡς περὶ μὲν θηρία τέχνας εὑ- 
ρήκαμεν, 
ἡμεροῦμεν καὶ 


αἷς αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς 
πλείονος 
ἀξίας ποιοῦμεν, ἡμᾶς δ᾽ αὐτοὺς 


οὐδὲν ἂν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὠφελήσαιμεν. 


69 


(65) πρὸς τὴν τῆς φρονή- 
σεως ἄσκησιν ταῦτα μηδεμίαν 


ἡγοῦνται δύναμιν ἔχειν. 


4} ’ a 

(α΄ δ΄") ἔπειτ᾽ εἰ τῶν μὲν σω- 
μάτων μηδὲν οὕτως ἂν φήσειαν 
ΗΝ [οὶ Ως \ 
εἶναι φαῦλον, 6 τι γυμνασθὲν 
καὶ πονῆσαν οὐκ ἂν εἴη βέλτιον, 
\ A A \ A 
Tas δὲ ψυχὰς τὰς ἄμεινον πεφυ- 
κυίας τῶν σωμάτων μηδὲν ἂν 
νομίζουσι γενέσθαι σπουδαιοτέρας 
παιδευθείσας καὶ τυχούσας τῆς 


προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας" 


(c!) ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους 

\ Ἁ , \ Ἁ ἴα 
καὶ τοὺ κὐν ας καὶτὰ πλεῖστα 
τῶν ζώων ὁρῶντες τέχνας ἔχον- 

, « A A > 7 
τάς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρειό- 
\ \ , A 

TEpa, TA δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ 
φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ 
τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν 
οἴονται τοιαύτην εὑρῆσθαι παι- 
δείαν, ἥτις ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐπί τι τούτων 
~ 4 A \ ’ , 
ὧνπερ Kal τὰ θηρία δυνηθείη προα- 
γαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἁπάντων 
ἡμῶν ἀτυχίαν κατεγνώκα- 
σιν, ὥσθ᾽ ὁμολογήσειαν μὲν ἂν 
ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἕκαστον 
τῶν ὄντων βέλτιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ 
χρησιμώτερον, 
τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν φρόνησιν ταύτην, 


3 \ ’ Sry 
αὐτοὺς δ᾽ ἡμᾶς 


ΝΕ ; ’ ” A 
ἢ παντα πλείονος ἄξια ποιουμέεν, 


τολμῶσι λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν 


ἀλλήλους πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν εὐερ- 


γετήσαιμεν. 


70 THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES ΟΝ 


(c’’) ὁ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, 


« ’ Ψ A > ‘ 

ὅτι καθ ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν 
θεωροῦντες ἐν τοῖς θαύμασι τοὺς 

, , “ 

μὲν λέοντας πραότερον διακειμέ- 
νους πρὸς τοὺς θεραπεύοντας ἢ 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνιοι πρὸς τοὺς 
> n 4 y ” 

εὖ ποιοῦντας, τὰς ὃ ἄρκτους 
καλινδουμένας καὶ μιμουμένας τὰς 
«- Ud > U ᾽ ᾽ > ζ΄ 

ἡμετέρας ἐπιστήμας, οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τού- 
των δύνανται γνῶναι τὴν παιδείαν 

% 3! > , “ ” 

καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅσην ἔχει 
δύναμιν, οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ταῦτα πολὺ ἂν 
θᾶττον τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ἢ 


\ ᾽ ’ ᾽ Ul 
τὴν ἐκείνων ὠφελήσειεν. 


(α΄) is expanded from (a) by enumeration of details: 
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πράγμασι © πάσας Tas πράξεις Kal τὰς τέχνας 
ἐπιμέλεια © ταῖς μελέταις καὶ ταῖς φιλοπονίαις 

(b’) is a restatement of (b) in more abstract form: 
πρὸς δὲ TO βελτίους ἡμᾶς Kal φρονιμωτέρους γίγνεσθαι © πρὸς THY 
τῆς φρονήσεως ἄσκησιν 

(α΄ δ΄) is a doublet of (a) and (6), giving a single illustration 
(σῶμα) of the phrase πάσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς τέχνας. 

The second thought (c) is developed by means of contrast 
of a negative statement with an affirmative. In the passage 
in the Antidosis certain adjective phrases have been added 
which merely bring out the thought implied in the original 
statement. 


A a a“ 3 , 
μηδὲ KaTAYVaS τῶν ἀνθρώ- 
πων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν ὡς 
περὶ μὲν θηρία τέχνας εὑρήκαμεν 
+e 
ais κτλ. 


περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται tocat- 
τὴν εὑρῆσθαι παιδείαν ἥτις . .. 
ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἁπάντων ἡμῶν 
ἀτυχίαν κατεγνώκασιν 


ὥσθ᾽ ὁμολογήσειαν. . .. 


CICERO, DIONYSIUS AND ARISTIDES 71 


Here the words μηδεμίαν... ἀλλὰ introduce the usual con- 
trast between the negative and affirmative statements of the 
thought. Note also the presence of certain words in both 
Ad Nic. and Ant. μηδὲ καταγνῷς . . 
κατεγνώκασιν of ... , forming, as it were, a framework on 
which the expanded form is put. 

Finally the thought of training animals (c—c’’) is presented 
again with different examples: 


. δυστυχίαν © ws... ἀτυχίαν 


ὃ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον ... τοὺς λέοντας, 


περὶ θηρία KTA. © < πραότερον διακειμένους ... , 


Tas δ᾽ ἄρκτους καλινδουμένας, . .. 


Ad Nic., 17, ζήτει νόμους. . . ποιοῦσιν is developed in Pan- 
ath., 144. In the Ad Nicoclem the requisites for good laws 
are stated; they must be just, useful, consistent, and prevent 
long and troublesome litigation. Isocrates develops this in 
the Antidosis by contrast. Speaking of the good old laws, he 
first enumerates the qualities they did not possess, ἑώρων τούς 
TE νόμους ἀναγεγραμμένους, οὐχ ὁμοίους τοῖς νῦν κειμένοις, οὐδὲ KTX., 
then he introduces with ἀλλά the positive qualities of the laws. 


Ad Nic., 17 Panath., 144 


(πεῖ vowous ... OuKatous ἑώρων τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγε- 


καὶ συμφέροντας καὶ σφί- 
σιν αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμέ- 
vous, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἵτινες 
τὰς μὲν ἀμφισβητήσεις ὡς ἐλαχί- 
στας, τὰς δὲ διαλύσεις ὡς οἷόν τε 


ταχίστας τοῖς πολίταις ποιοῦσιν. 


γραμμένους, οὐχ ὁμοίους τοῖς νῦν 
κειμένοις, οὐδὲ τοσαύτης ταραχῆς 
καὶ τοσούτων ἐναντιώσεων με- 
στοὺς ὥστε μηδὲν ἂν δυνηθῆναι 
συνιδεῖν μήτε τοὺς χρησίμους μήτε 
ἀλλὰ 


πρῶτον μὲν ὀλίγους, ἱκανοὺς δὲ 


τοὺς ἀχρήστους αὐτῶν, 


τοῖς χρῆσθαι μέλλουσι καὶ ῥᾳδίους 
συνιδεῖν, ἔπειτα δικαίους καὶ 
συμφέροντας καὶ σφίσιν 


αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους͵ 


72 


THE INFLUENCE OF ISOCRATES 


The thought of Ad Nic., 31, is developed in Nicocles, 37, by 
putting in a detailed and concrete form what is expressed as 
an abstract principle in the Ad Nic. 


Ad Nic., 31 


ἄλλους 


κοσμίως ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ βασιλέας 


μὴ τοὺς μὲν ἀξίου 


ἀτάκτως, ἀλλὰ τὴν σωφρο- 


σύνην παράδειγμα τοῖς 
ἄλλοις καθίστη, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι 
τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος 


ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. 


Nicocles, 37 


περὶ “σωφροσύνης... ἅμα 
δὲ παρἀδειγμα καταστῆσαι 
τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
φι- 
λεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τούτοις 


πολίταις, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι 


τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι τὸν 


βίον διάγέιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν 
τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς av- 


τῶν ὁρῶσι διατρίβοντας. 


a a -ὐς " 


ae — 


—. 





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